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INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 has played a major role in
reshaping many aspects of American society. It has been called a
"proven super-statute" that "successfully penetrate[d] public
normative and institutional culture in a deep way."2
One of the Act's remarkable features that likely has
contributed to its impact is that most of its requirements are
enforceable through injunctions. For violations of certain
provisions, including Title 1,3 which prohibits racial
discrimination in voter registration,4 and Title II,5 concerning
places of public accommodation, 6 an injunction is the only
t Assistant Professor of Law, Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law, Barry University.
Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, 2012-2014; Yale Law
School, J.D., 2003; Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public &
International Affairs, A.B., 2000. The author wishes to thank Daniel Epps, Richard
Fallon, Daniel Farber, Joseph Fishman, Maggie Gardner, Erica Goldberg, John C.P.
Goldberg, Sharon Jacobs, William Ortman, Doug Rendleman, Seth Stoughton, Tracy A
Thomas, Susannah Barton Tobin, Matthew Wansley, and the participants at the
University of Chicago Legal Forum and New England Law's Junior Faculty Scholarship
Workshop for their advice, questions, and comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to
thank Ben Berkman and the staff of the University of Chicago Legal Forum for their
outstanding editorial assistance.
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241 (1964).
2 William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215,
1237 (2001).
42 USC § 1971(c) (pre-existing remedial provision that Title I of the Civil Rights
Act relied upon and expanded).
4 Civil Rights Act § 101, 78 Stat at 241-42.
Id §§ 204(a), 206(a), 207(b), 78 Stat at 244-46; see Newman u Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc, 390 US 400, 402 (1968) ("When a plaintiff brings an action under ...
Title [II], he cannot recover damages.").
6 Civil Rights Act §§ 201-03, 78 Stat at 243-44.
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available remedy.7 Along with backpay,8 injunctions are the
primary remedy for racial discrimination in employment 9 in
violation of Title VII.10 The Supreme Court has also recognized
implied rights of action for both injunctive relief and damages
for intentional racial discrimination" by federally funded
programs in violation of Title VI. 12
For some types of Civil Rights Act violations, only the
Attorney General may seek an injunction. 1 3 Under certain
circumstances, he or she may also intervene in private suits 14 or
even sue on behalf of alleged victims of discrimination who are
unable to bring suit themselves.15
The Civil Rights Act does not expressly specify whether
courts are required to issue injunctions in response to past or
impending violations, or identify particular circumstances under
which they should grant injunctions to prevailing plaintiffs. And
Title II's provisions governing injunctive relief, id § 204(a), 78 Stat at 244, have
been incorporated into other civil rights statutes, including the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC § 12188. See Dudley v Hannaford Brothers Co, 333 F3d
299, 304 (1st Cir 2003) ("Title III [of the ADA] ... allows only injunctive relief (as
opposed to money damages).").
8 Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat at 261. See also Albemarle Paper Co v Moody,
422 US 405, 419-21 (1975).
9 Civil Rights Act § 706(g), 78 Stat at 261.
10 Id §§ 703-04, 78 Stat at 255-58.
" See Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 696-97 (1979); see also
Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 281 (2001). The Court declined to recognize an
implied right of action against federally funded programs that have a disparate racial
impact in violation of federal regulations. Alexander, 532 US at 293.
12 Civil Rights Act § 601, 78 Stat at 252. Federal agencies also may cut off funding
for programs that discriminate. Id § 602, 78 Stat at 252-53.
s See id § 206(a), 78 Stat at 245 (permitting the Attorney General to seek to enjoin
a pattern or practice of discrimination in places of public accommodation in violation of
Title II); id § 707(a), 78 Stat at 261-62 (same for pattern or practice of employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII). The Attorney General also may seek to enjoin
violations of voting rights under Title I, see 42 USC § 197 1(c). Courts have split over
whether private litigants may do so, as well. Compare Mixon v Ohio, 193 F3d 389, 407
n 12 (6th Cir 1999), with Schwier v Cox, 340 F3d 1284, 1296 (11th Cir 2003).
14 Civil Rights Act § 204(a), 78 Stat at 244 (permitting the Attorney General to
intervene in suits alleging racial discrimination in places of public accommodation in
violation of Title II); Civil Rights Act § 706(e), 78 Stat at 260 (same for suits alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII); Civil Rights Act § 902, 78 Stat at
266-67 (same for suits alleging certain Equal Protection violations).
1" Civil Rights Act § 301(a), 78 Stat at 246 (authorizing the Attorney General to
seek "such relief as may be appropriate" if a person alleges that a State or political
subdivision has denied him "equal utilization of any public facility"); Civil Rights Act
§ 407(a), 78 Stat at 248 (same where a public school allegedly is violating the equal
protection clause, or a student is barred from attending a public college for racially
discriminatory reasons).
ENFORCING EQUALITY
Supreme Court doctrine concerning statutory injunctions has
caused confusion among the lower courts, including under the
Civil Rights Act. A longstanding line of cases reaffirmed over the
past few years in eBay, Inc v MercExchange, LLC 16 and Winter u
Natural Resources Defense Councill7 emphasizes that, in
general, a court may not automatically, or even presumptively,
issue an injunction when a federal statute is violated. Instead, a
court must exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis by
applying a four-factor test,18 a process often called "equitable
balancing."19 eBay and Winter raise the issues of: (i) whether a
prevailing plaintiff in a Civil Rights Act case must make some
additional showing, beyond establishing a statutory violation, in
order to obtain injunctive relief, (ii) how the four-factor eBay test
should be applied in the Civil Rights Act context, and (iii) what
the consequences would be of denying injunctive relief to Civil
Rights Act plaintiffs based on eBay's "non-merits" factors. In
exploring these issues, this Article more broadly seeks to reveal
the contradictions and shortcomings of using injunctions as
remedies for statutory violations in general, and the deficiencies
in the Supreme Court's current doctrine governing them.
This Article argues that the standard governing the
issuance of injunctions for statutory violations, including in the
civil rights context, should depend on the nature of the
injunction the plaintiff seeks. Part I begins by reviewing current
doctrine, explaining that courts generally may not grant
injunctions as a matter of course to prevent or remedy violations
of most statutes that provide for injunctive relief, but instead
must engage in case-by-case balancing of the equitable
considerations endorsed by the eBay Court.
Part II reviews the wide range of approaches courts have
employed in considering whether to grant injunctive relief under
the Civil Rights Act. It demonstrates that, under current
16 547 US 388 (2006).
17 555 US 7 (2008).
18 eBay, 547 US at 394 (explaining that a court should issue a permanent injunction
only if: (i) the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of such relief, (ii) he or
she lacks an adequate remedy at law, (iii) the balance of hardships favors the plaintiff,
and (iv) an injunction would be in the public interest); see Section I.A (discussing the
four-factor standard in greater detail). Winter establishes a similar test for preliminary
injunctions. 555 US at 20.
19 This phrase may be something of a misnomer, since courts often treat the
considerations identified in eBay as hard-and-fast requirements for injunctive relief,
rather than factors to be balanced against each other. See Section I.A.
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doctrine, the eBay Court's four-prong balancing test should
apply to requests for injunctions under the Act. It then explores
the difficulty of attempting to modify that standard to take into
account the Act's special purpose.
Part III turns to the normative argument at the heart of
this Article, arguing that the manner in which Congress and the
courts consider statutory injunctions should depend on the
nature of the relief the plaintiff seeks:
* Remedial (non-monetary) relief: Remedial relief is
intended to ameliorate harm that a plaintiff has suffered
due to a past statutory violation. A court should grant, if
possible, a prevailing plaintiff's request for a non-
monetary remedial order that is tailored or proportionate
to the harm he or she has suffered, unless the combined
burden or harm that such an order would cause for the
defendant and third parties would overwhelmingly
outweigh the benefit to the plaintiff.
* Remedial (monetary) relief: A plaintiff's request for a
remedial order requiring the payment of money should be
treated as an action for compensatory damages.
* Prospective relief: A court should automatically issue an
injunction when a plaintiff establishes that future
violations of a statute are likely to occur, and address the
propriety of enforcing that injunction during subsequent
contempt proceedings. Congress, however, should avoid
enacting statutes that provide for such relief, and instead
make civil contempt-type remedies directly available for
statutory violations.
* Prophylactic relief: Courts should avoid issuing
injunctions that prohibit conduct that is not otherwise
illegal.
Part IV briefly concludes.
The question of whether and when injunctive relief should
be available under statutes is but one aspect of the broader
debate over the use of liability rules (in other words, damages)
and property rules (in other words, injunctionS20) to remedy
20 But see Michael T. Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the
180 [ 2014
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violations of legal entitlements. 21 The relative advantages of
liability and property rules tend to be considered primarily in
the context of common-law causes of action, 22 without
addressing the constraints that statutory text and separation-of-
powers principles place upon the choice between them. This
Article highlights the unique considerations that arise when
statutes make injunctive relief available, and offers a new
approach to determining the availability of such injunctions by
distinguishing among the various types of orders a plaintiff may
seek.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
STATUTORY VIOLATIONS
Federal laws that provide for injunctive relief generally do
not specify the circumstances under which a court should grant
an injunction to a prevailing plaintiff. Rather, a statute typically
will state only that a court "may" issue an injunction when its
substantive provisions are violated, 23 implicitly leaving it to the
courts to determine when such relief is appropriate. Particularly
where injunctions are the primary or sole mechanism for
enforcing a federal statute, this discretion to determine whether
to issue an injunction allows courts to effectively nullify a law by
failing to either provide a remedy for past violations or attempt
to prevent future ones.
Government, 35 Cardozo L Rev 2453, 2488 (2014) (arguing that, at least in the public law
realm, the concept of "property rule" should be disaggregated into "potential property
rule," referring to people who have a substantial likelihood of obtaining an injunction if
they go to court, and "complete property rule," referring to people who actually are
protected by an injunction).
21 See generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972)
(arguing that courts should choose between liability rules and property rules to enforce
legal entitlements based on transaction costs, distributional concerns, and other justice-
related considerations).
22 But see Morley, 35 Cardozo L Rev at 2492-93 (cited in note 20) (explaining how
the Cathedral framework of liability and property rules should be applied in public law
cases).
23 See, for example, 15 USC § 53(b) (providing that a "court may issue[ ] a
permanent injunction" against false advertisements) (emphasis added); 15 USC
§ 8131(2) (providing that "a court may award injunctive relief" in a suit for cyberpiracy)
(emphasis added); 27 USC § 122a(d)(1) ("[U]pon a proper showing by the attorney
general of [a] State, the court may issue a preliminary or permanent injunction to
restrain a violation" of federal liquor laws.) (emphasis added).
177] 18 1
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Section A begins by discussing the traditional four-factor
test that courts generally must apply when exercising their
discretion to grant injunctive relief, including statutory
injunctions. Section B discusses the rare circumstances under
which courts lack such discretion and are required to issue
statutory injunctions to successful plaintiffs. Finally, Section C
discusses the range of alternate approaches that academic
commentators have recommended for determining the
availability of injunctions under federal statutes.
A. Equitable Balancing and Statutory Injunctions
Federal courts generally must exercise their equitable
powers according to the standards employed by English
Chancery courtS24 at the time of the nation's founding. 25
Purportedly applying those traditional equitable principles, 26
the Supreme Court has held that, when a federal statute
provides for injunctive relief,27 a court has discretion to decide
whether to issue an injunction to prevent an impending
violation or recurrences of past violations, or to remedy any such
24 See Robinson v Campbell, 16 US 212, 222-23 (1818). Compare with Hayburn's
Case, 2 US 409, 413-14 (1792) ("THE COURT considers the practice of the courts of
King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this
court. . .").
2' Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v Alliance Bond Fund, Inc, 527 US 308, 318
(1999). See also Atlas Life Insurance Co v W. L Southern, Inc, 306 US 563, 568 (1939).
26 Many prominent commentators have questioned the historical provenance of
eBay's and Winter's four-factor tests, or certain elements of them. See Mark P. Gergen,
John M. Golden, and Henry P. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The
Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 Colum L Rev 203, 207 (2012) ("[T]he Supreme
Court's four-factor test differs from traditional equitable practice in at least three, and
possibly four, significant ways."); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions, 91 Harv L Rev 525, 527 (1978) ("[T]he attempt to divine a single standard
for preliminary relief is scarcely a century old . . . ."). See also Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 Cal L Rev 524, 556, 562 (1982)
(arguing that, prior to Hecht Co v Bowles, 321 US 321 (1944), many cases had held that
"injunctions for statutory violations could be issued without traditional threshold
showings"). Compare with Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest,
51 Geo Wash L Rev 382, 385-86 (1983) (arguing that, historically, a person had to show
that an injunction was necessary to prevent "immediate, substantial, and irreparable"
harm, there was no adequate remedy at law, and the terms of the injunction were
judicially manageable).
27 A statute may provide for injunctive relief either expressly or as part of an
implied right of action. See Fitzgerald v Barnstable School Committee, 555 US 246, 255
(2009), citing Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 US 60, 76 (1992); Rondeau
v Mosinee Paper Corp, 422 US 49, 62-63 (1975).
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past violations. 28 Even when Article III's justiciability
requirements are met, 2 9 a court is not required to automatically
award injunctive relief unless the statute's text or legislative
history 30 "unequivocal[ly]" mandates it.31 As the Court
explained, "The grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a
statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and
all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not
mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation
of law."32 Indeed, the Court repeatedly has rejected the notion
that injunctive relief against statutory violations is even
presumptively appropriate or should be denied only in
28 Monsanto Co u Geertson Seed Farms, 561 US 139, 156-158 (2010); Winter, 555
US at 24, 32 (holding that equitable balancing generally is required for both preliminary
and permanent injunctions); Weinberger v Romero-Barcelo, 456 US 305, 306-07 (1982)
(rejecting the First Circuit's holding that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
'requires a district court to enjoin immediately all discharges of pollutants that do not
comply with the Act's permit requirements"); Rondeau, 422 US at 58-59 (rejecting the
Seventh Circuit's holding that a plaintiff need not show irreparable injury to obtain an
injunction under the Williams Act, 15 USC § 78m(d), which requires an investor to
disclose when she acquires a large fraction of a company's shares); Hecht, 321 US at 326,
328-29 (rejecting the DC Circuit's holding that the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942
"require[d] the issuance of an injunction or other order as a matter of course, once
violations were found"). See also Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill, 437 US 153, 193
(1978) ("[A] federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an
injunction for every violation of law."). Compare with Jason David Fregeau, Comment,
Statutes and Judicial Discretion: Against the Law ... Sort Of, 18 BC Envir Affairs L Rev
501, 541 (1991) ("The Supreme Court has taken contradictory positions on whether
equitable discretion may be used to permit violations of statutes to continue.").
29 A court lacks jurisdiction to issue an injunction if the plaintiff lacks standing to
seek prospective relief, see City of Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95, 108 (1983) (holding
that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek an injunction against illegal police chokeholds,
because he failed to show a sufficient likelihood that he would again "be subjected to a
chokehold without any provocation whatsoever"), or the dispute has become moot,
United States v W. T Grant Co, 345 US 629, 635 (1953) (affirming district court's refusal
to enjoin interlocking corporate directorates after the defendants voluntarily terminated
the allegedly illegal conduct and there was no reason to believe they would resume it in
the future).
so See, for example, Weinberger, 456 US at 319 (allowing consideration of legislative
history in deciding whether a law requires courts to grant injunctions to prevailing
plaintiffs); Hecht, 321 US at 327-28 (same).
s Hecht, 321US at 329. See also Amoco Production Co u Village of Gambell, 480 US
531, 544 (1987) (holding that equitable balancing is required before issuing a statutory
injunction unless there exists a "clear indication ... that Congress intended to deny
federal district courts their traditional equitable discretion"); Weinberger, 456 US at 320
(holding that "a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be
lightly implied").
32 Weinberger, 456 US at 313. See also Amoco, 480 US at 542; Winter, 555 US at 32
("An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the
merits as a matter of course.").
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extraordinary circumstances, 33 explaining that "[n]o such thumb
on the scales is warranted."34
As one commentator characterizes current doctrine:
Both Professor Calabresi and Justice Scalia have said
that we live in an age of statutes. That may be true as to
"rights," but it appears to have little weight when it
comes to equitable remedies. Here, the Court remains
committed to a traditional approach that emphasizes the
discretionary nature of the decision to grant or withhold
the equitable remedy. 35
In eBay, the Court recently reiterated that, to obtain a
permanent injunction under a federal statute, a plaintiff must
not only prevail in its underlying cause of action, but further
demonstrate that:
(1) [he] has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages,
are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and
(4) the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction. 36
B Monsanto, 561 US at 157 (rejecting the presumption "that an injunction is the
proper remedy for a NEPA violation except in unusual circumstances"); eBay, 547 US at
393 (rejecting the Federal Circuit's holding that injunctions against patent infringement
should be denied only in "'unusual" cases, "'exceptional circumstances," or "'rare
instances'), quoting MercExchange, LLC v eBay, Inc, 401 F3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed Cir
2005), revd eBay, 547 US at 393; Amoco, 480 US at 534, 541 (rejecting the Ninth
Circuit's holding that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act required a
district court to automatically enjoin exploration activities occurring without a
statutorily required permit, except in "'rare or unusual circumstances'), quoting Village
of Gambell u Hodel, 774 F2d 1414, 1423 (9th Cir 1985), revd Amoco, 480 US at 534.
34 Monsanto, 561 US at 158 ("It is not enough for a court considering a request for
injunctive relief to ask whether there is a good reason why an injunction should not
issue.").
" James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 Lewis &
Clark L Rev 555, 575 (2010).
1 eBay, 547 US at 391, 393-94; accord Monsanto, 561 US at 156-157. See also
Amoco, 480 US at 542; Weinberger, 456 US at 312-13; Rondeau, 422 US at 63 (holding
that a plaintiff suing under the securities laws must "establish[] the traditional
184 [ 2014
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Winter went on to explain that the requirements for
obtaining a preliminary injunction are similar, except that the
plaintiff must demonstrate "that he is likely to succeed in the
merits."37
Under the eBay standard, a plaintiff must establish that,
without an injunction, irreparable injury is not only possible,
but "likely,"38 and a court generally may not presume that
irreparable injury will result from a statutory violation. 39
Moreover, the court must give serious consideration to the
balance-of-hardships and public-interest elements, rather than
treating them "in only a cursory fashion"40; it may not assume
that enjoining violations of the underlying statute will be
categorically in the public interest.4 1 In Winter, for example, the
Court held that the district court erred in issuing a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Navy from conducting sonar exercises
because, even assuming that such exercises would irreparably
harm marine wildlife, and that the Navy was conducting them
without having completed the National Environmental Policy
Act's (NEPA) decision-making process, 4 2  the balance-of-
hardships and public interest considerations both favored their
prerequisites of relief'); Mills v Electric Auto-Lite Co, 396 US 375, 386 (1970), quoting
Hecht, 321 US at 329-30 (holding that, when deciding whether to enjoin a statutory
violation, a court generally must "keep[ ] in mind the role of equity as 'the instrument for
nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well
as between competing private claims'). Some early commentators had assumed that a
plaintiff need not satisfy these requirements when a statute authorizes the issuance of
injunctions. See, for example, Comment, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement
Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 Yale L J 1023, 1024 (1948) ("[L]egislative provision for
an injunction liberates the remedy from many of the bonds of equity by satisfying of
itself conditions which the Chancellor would otherwise require to be established in each
case.").
1 Winter, 555 US at 20, 32. See also Amoco, 480 US at 546 n 12 ("The standard for
a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the
exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than
actual success."). But see Brown v Chote, 411 US 452, 457 (1973) (affirming issuance of
preliminary injunction without regard to "the ultimate merits of [plaintiffs]
contentions").
"' Winter, 555 US at 22.
39 Amoco, 480 US at 544-45; see also Robert Bosch, LLC v Pylon Manufacturing
Corp, 659 F3d 1142, 1149 (Fed Cir 2011) (holding, in a patent case, that "eBay jettisoned
the presumption of irreparable harm as it applies to determining the appropriateness of
injunctive relief").
40 Winter, 555 US at 26.
41 Amoco, 480 US at 545-46.
42 Winter, 555 US at 23-24, 31 n 5.
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continuation. 43 This ruling is even more noteworthy because it
went on to emphasize that the Court would apply the same
standards in deciding whether to issue a permanent
injunction.44
Because an injunction is an extraordinary remedy,45 a court
should deny injunctive relief if it is confident that it can achieve
"compliance" with the underlying statute through other
means,4 6 such as when a defendant is independently committed
to complying with the law.4 7 Perhaps more controversially, the
Court has upheld lower courts' refusals to issue injunctions to
prevent ongoing statutory violations,4 8 or as remedies for
completed statutory violations,4 9 where the policies or goals
underlying the law at issue could be furthered through some
means other than strict adherence to the statute itself.50
43 Id at 24. See also Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v Galloway, 492 F3d 532,
543-45 (4th Cir 2007) (upholding denial of permanent injunction based on the balance-
of-hardships and public interest factors, despite the fact that the plaintiff had
established a copyright violation and faced irreparable harm).
44 Winter, 555 US at 24.
41 Id. But see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv L Rev 1281, 1292 (1976) ("[S]urely, the old sense of equitable remedies as
extraordinary' has faded."); Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 545 (cited in note 26).
46 Monsanto, 561 US at 165-166 ("If a less drastic remedy ... was sufficient to
redress respondents' injury, no recourse to the additional and extraordinary relief of an
injunction was warranted."); Weinberger, 456 US at 318, 320 ("We read the FWPCA as
permitting the exercise of a court's equitable discretion . . . to order relief that will
achieve compliance with the Act."). See also Amoco, 480 US at 543 n 8.
47 See Hecht, 321 US at 328 (recognizing that, under certain circumstances, such as
when a defendant who previously violated a statute has taken steps to prevent future
violations, injunctive relief may be unnecessary).
48 See notes 51-53 & accompanying text (discussing Weinberger); Amoco, 480 US at
544 (affirming "the [d]istrict [c]ourt's refusal to issue a preliminary injunction against all
exploration activities," even though the Secretary of the Interior had not yet fulfilled
statutorily required prerequisites for permitting such exploration, because it "did not
undermine [the statutory] policy"). Then Justice Rehnquist wrote approvingly of a court's
discretion to "refuse to order a federal official to take specific action, even though the
action might be required by law," when equitable balancing does not support such relief
Hill, 437 US at 213 (Rehnquist dissenting), citing United States U Dern, 289 US 352, 360
(1933). Professor Plater contends that Dern does not support the proposition for which
Justice Rehnquist cited it, however, arguing that "it was never clear whether the
defendant [in Dern] had violated any statute." Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 559 (cited in
note 26).
49 Rondeau, 422 US at 59 (declining to issue a remedial injunction after a
shareholder violated the Williams Act, 15 USC § 78m(d), by purchasing more than 5% of
a company's shares without filing the necessary disclosure with the SEC, because "none
of the evils to which the Williams Act was directed has occurred or is threatened in this
case").
'o See also Mills, 396 US at 386 (emphasis added), quoting J. I Case Co v Borak,
377 US 426, 433 (1964) (holding that, "upon finding a violation [of a statute] the courts
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Weinberger u Romero-Barcelo5 l is perhaps the best example
of the Court exercising this discretion. The Court recognized
that the Navy was discharging ordnance in the waters around
Vieques Island without a permit in violation of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).52 Upholding the district
court's equitable balancing, the Court affirmed its refusal to
enjoin the Navy from discharging ordnance until the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a permit, even
though the statute clearly prohibited such discharges without
one. 53
In United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 54
however, the Court cautioned that a district court cannot rely on
equitable balancing to "override Congress's policy choice,
articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be
prohibited."55 The purpose of equitable balancing-particularly
the balance-of-hardships and public interest prongs-is to
determine whether issuing an injunction "should be chosen over
another permissible means" of enforcing a statute, not "whether
enforcement is preferable to no enforcement at all."5 6 Thus,
while a court cannot use eBay's four-factor balancing test to
override or nullify Congress's policy decisions,5 7 it may decide
[a]re 'to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose'). See, for example, United States v Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority, 256 F3d 36, 50-51 (1st Cir 2001) (upholding district court's refusal
to order Massachusetts to comply with EPA rules regarding filtration of public water
supplies, after the State had failed to satisfy EPA regulations concerning tolerable water
contamination levels, because a court "retains a measure of flexibility" under the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 USC § 300g-3(b), to determine how best to bring about
Congress's goal of clean drinking water).
"' 456 US 305 (1982).
12 Id at 307-08.
5 Id at 314-16; see also id at 328 (Stevens dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
holding that an injunction need not be issued to stop "an ongoing deliberate violation of a
federal statute").
14 532 US 483 (2001).
Id at 497. See also Virginian Railway Co u System Federation No 40, 300 US 515,
552 (1937) (arguing that Congress's decision to mandate negotiations between railroads
and labor unions "is in itself a declaration of public interest and policy which should be
persuasive in inducing courts to give relief").
" Oakland Cannabis, 532 US at 497-98. See also id at 498 ("[W]hen a court of
equity exercises its discretion, it may not consider the advantages and disadvantages of
nonenforcement of the statute," but rather how the public interest and conveniences of
the parties "are affected by the selection of an injunction over other enforcement
mechanisms."); Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L J 291, 340 (2003).
1 Oakland Cannabis, 532 US at 497-98.
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that the goals Congress intended to further through a statute
could best be advanced by allowing statutory violations to
continue.5 8
The Court has enforced equitable balancing even in
constitutional cases.59 Indeed, one of the main reasons, aside
from "Our Federalism,"60 that the Court established the Younger
doctrine-which generally prohibits federal courts from
enjoining pending state criminal proceedings, even where the
state laws that were violated are allegedly unconstitutional 61-
is because defendants in such proceedings cannot satisfy the
traditional equitable requirements for injunctive relief.62 The
Court explained, "[T]he cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of
having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not
by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the special legal
sense of that term." 63 Moreover, a criminal defendant seeking to
raise constitutional challenges to his prosecution has an
adequate remedy at law, because he can present those
arguments in his criminal case and ultimately seek certiorari
from the Supreme Court.64 City of Los Angeles u Lyons65
similarly relied on the traditional equitable requirements for
injunctive relief as an alternate basis for rejecting the plaintiff's
challenge to the Los Angeles Police Department's allegedly
unconstitutional policy permitting the unnecessary use of
chokeholds.66
Prior to the Court's strident reaffirmation of the four-factor
test in eBay and Winter, several circuits had held that "[t]he
standard requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied
38 Weinberger, 456 US at 319; Amoco, 480 US at 544.
'9 As one influential article explains, "[T]he interest in immediate protection of
constitutional rights may be offset by the disruptive effects of injunctive relief and by
judicial reluctance to interfere with coordinate or subordinate political bodies, so that a
balancing results which is not wholly different from that in nonconstitutional cases." The
Changing Limits of Injunctive Relief, 78 Harv L Rev 997, 1007 (1965).
£0 Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 44-45 (1971).
61 Id at 46.
62 Id at 43-44 ("[C]ourts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to
restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law
and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.").
61 Id at 46.
64 Id at 50.
£3 461 US 95 (1983).
66 Id at 111 (holding that an "equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of
irreparable injury," and that the plaintiff's damages suit was "an adequate remedy at
law" for the allegedly unconstitutional use of chokeholds by the police).
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when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a federal
statute which specifically provides for injunctive relief."67 Other
courts had held that, rather than the traditional equitable
factors, successful plaintiffs need show only that it was possible
that future statutory violations would occur, 68 which is more of a
standing requirement than a separate restriction on equitable
relief.69 Over the past half-decade, however, "the four-factor test
from eBay has, in many federal courts, become the test for
whether a permanent injunction should issue, regardless of
whether the dispute in question centers on patent law."7 0 Lower
courts have applied eBay's four-factor test in a wide range of
contexts, including intellectual property cases, 71 cases involving
£7 See, for example, Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Department of Revenue, 934
F2d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir 1991). See also United States v White, 769 F2d 511, 515 (8th Cir
1985); United States u Buttorff, 761 F2d 1056, 1059, 1065 (5th Cir 1985); CSX
Transportation, Inc u Tennessee State Board of Equalization, 964 F2d 548, 551 (6th Cir
1992) ("[S]ince Congress has expressly authorized the granting of injunctive relief to halt
or prevent a violation of [49 USC] § 11503, traditional equitable criteria do not govern
the issuance of preliminary injunctions under § 11503."). Following eBay and Winter,
many courts have questioned or rejected holdings such as these. See, for example,
Galloway, 492 F3d at 543; Kane v Chobani, Inc, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 99359, *20-25 (ND
Cal); E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co v Kolon Industries, Inc, 894 F Supp 2d 691, 706
(ED Va 2012).
£8 See, for example, Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Hunt, 591 F2d
1211, 1220 (7th Cir 1979) ("Actions for statutory injunctions need not meet the
requirements for an injunction imposed by traditional equity jurisprudence. Once a
violation is demonstrated, the moving party need show only that there is some
reasonable likelihood of future violations."); Wisconsin v Stockbridge-Munsee
Community, 67 F Supp 2d 990, 994 (ED Wis 1999) ("[I]n actions for statutory
injunctions, once a violation of the act or regulation is shown, the moving party need
show only that there is some reasonable likelihood of future violations.").
69 Compare with Lyons, 461 US at 108 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to
seek an injunction against allegedly unconstitutional chokeholds by police, since he could
not show it was sufficiently likely that he would be subjected to such chokeholds in the
future).
70 Gergen, Golden, and Smith, 112 Colum L Rev at 205 (cited in note 26). See also
Voice of the Arab World, Inc v MDTV Medical News Now, Inc, 645 F3d 26, 33 (1st Cir
2011) ("[T]he text and logic of eBay strongly suggest that the traditional principles of
equity it discussed should be presumed to apply whenever a court must determine
whether to issue an injunction, whether the case is a patent case or any other type of
case."); Salinger v Colting, 607 F3d 68, 78 & n 7 (2d Cir 2010) (emphasis added) ("eBay
strongly indicates that the traditional principles of equity it employed are the
presumptive standard for injunctions in any context. . . . [W]e see no reason that eBay
would not apply with equal force to an injunction in any type of case.").
71 See, for example, Voice of the Arab World, 645 F3d at 31 (trademark
infringement); CoxCom, Inc v Chaffee, 536 F3d 101, 104, 112 (1st Cir 2008) (Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 USC § 1201); Salinger, 607 F3d at 73-74 (copyright);
Osmose, Inc v Viance, LLC, 612 F3d 1298, 1320 (11th Cir 2010) (false advertising under
the Lanham Act, 15 USC § 1125(a)).
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other types of economic harms, 72 environmental cases, 7 3
constitutional cases, 7 4 and cases arising under various other
statutes.75
B. Mandatory Statutory Injunctions
A "clear statement" rule protects courts' discretion to
determine whether to grant statutory injunctions to successful
plaintiffs.76 Occasionally, a statute's text or legislative history
72 See, for example, Sanders v Mountain American Federal Credit Union, 689 F3d
1138, 1144 (10th Cir 2012) (Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 USC § 1601); Smith v
Sohaan Development, Inc, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 79708, *1, *3 (MD Fla) (preliminary
injunctions under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 USC § 201 et seq);
FXDirectDealer, LLC v Abadi, 2012 US Dist LEXIS 49588, *19-20 (SDNY) (Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 USC § 1030).
7 See, for example, Animal Welfare Institute v Martin, 623 F3d 19, 27-28 (1st Cir
2010) (Endangered Species Act, 16 USC § 1531 et seq); National Resources Defense
Council, Inc v Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc, 906 F2d 934, 941 (3d Cir 1990)
(Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1365); Brooklyn Heights Association v National Park
Service, 777 F Supp 2d 424, 434-35 (EDNY 2011) (Land and Water Conservation Fund
Act of 1965, 16 USC § 460i-8).
74 Courts have held that the four-factor test must be applied in preemption cases
under the Supremacy Clause, United States v Alabama, 691 F3d 1269, 1281, 1301 (11th
Cir 2012); Independent Training and Apprenticeship Program v California Department of
Industrial Relations, 730 F3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir 2013); Seventeenth Amendment
challenges to Senate elections, Judge v Quinn, 2008 US App LEXIS 28077, *26 (7th Cir);
challenges to prison regulations and conditions of parole under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Couch v Jabe, 737 F Supp 2d 561, 574 (WD Va 2010); Due Process and
Equal Protection challenges to ballot regulations, see Dudum v City and County of San
Francisco, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 94031, *15-16 (ND Cal), affd Dudum v Arntz, 640 F3d
1098 (9th Cir 2011); and numerous other constitutional provisions including the Fourth
Amendment, Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union v County of
Allegheny, 124 F Appx 140, 141-42 (3d Cir 2005); Commerce Clause, Heffner v Murphy,
866 F Supp 2d 358, 431-33 (MD Pa 2012); Property Clause, Minard Run Oil Co v United
States Forest Service, 894 F Supp 2d 642, 663 (WD Pa 2012); Due Process Clause, Esso
Standard Oil Co v Lopez-Freytes, 522 F3d 136, 148 (1st Cir 2008); and First Amendment,
Brown v Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 613 F3d 44, 49 (1st Cir 2010). Compare
with Regents of University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 320 (1978) (holding,
without balancing other equitable factors, that a student was "entitled to [an] injunction"
requiring his admission to medical school because the school's affirmative action
program violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
7 See, for example, Bedrossian v Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 409 F3d 840,
845 (7th Cir 2005) ("Congress did not intend to dispense of [sic] the irreparable harm
requirement in either USERRA or the False Claims Act."); United States v Miami
University, 294 F3d 797, 817-20 (6th Cir 2002) (considering all factors except for the
balance of hardships before issuing an injunction under the Family Education Rights
and Privacy Act ("FERPA'), 20 USC § 1234c(a)(4), against a schools release of students'
disciplinary records).
7 Under a "clear statement rule," a court will "presume" that an "established
background understanding . . . is part of [a] statute," unless "the legislature clearly
intends to displace [it]." William N. Eskridge Jr, Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U Pa L Rev 1007, 1011 (1989). The clear statement rule establishing
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may be sufficiently clear to override the presumption that
Congress intended to preserve this discretion.77 The Supreme
Court has never identified certain language as necessary or
sufficient to satisfy this requirement, however, and the
standards it has applied have varied from case to case.
For example, the Court has held that a court may exercise
equitable discretion both where a statute provides that it "may"
issue an injunction,78 as well as where a law states that the
court "shall" grant injunctive relief.79 Likewise, when a statute
provides that a court "shall have jurisdiction" to grant an
injunction, the Court has sometimes held that courts retain
discretion over the exercise of that power,80 while concluding on
other occasions that such language makes injunctive relief
mandatory.81
The Court also has pointed to the availability of alternate
potential remedies, such as damages, fines, or imprisonment, as
a basis for determining that injunctive relief is discretionary, 82
yet has affirmed the need for equitable balancing even under
a presumption in favor of equitable balancing is an application of the broader principle
that Congress is presumed to legislate consistently with both the common law and
longstanding historical practice, absent clear evidence of contrary legislative intent. See,
for example, Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 263 (1952).
7 Of course, the converse is true as well; statutes such as the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1996), codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 USC, prohibit courts from issuing injunctions
even when they would do so under traditional equitable principles.
78 eBay, 547 US at 392. See also New York Times Co, Inc v Tasani, 533 US 483, 505
(2001) (holding that, because the Copyright Act provides that courts "may' enjoin
infringement, they are not required to do so), quoting 17 USC § 502(a).
79 Hecht, 321 US at 328 (holding that the phrase "'shall be granted,'" as used in the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942's remedial provision, "is less mandatory than a
literal reading might suggest").
80 Weinberger, 456 US at 313 (holding that the FWPCA, 33 USC § 1319(b), which
grants courts "jurisdiction to restrain ... violation[s] and to require compliance," does
not require courts to enjoin all violations).
8' United Steelworkers of America v United States, 361 US 39, 56 (1959) (holding
that the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USC § 178, which gives courts
"jurisdiction ... to enjoin [any] such strike" that imperils national security, does not
allow courts to exercise equitable discretion over awarding injunctive relief). See also
Hill, 437 US at 194 (holding that the Endangered Species Act, 16 USC § 1540(g)(1),
requires courts to issue injunctive relief, even though it states only that "any person may
commence a civil suit . . . to enjoin [violations]" and federal courts shall have
"jurisdiction ... to enforce" the statute).
82 See Weinberger, 456 US at 314. See also Oakland Cannabis, 432 US at 497
(holding that courts have discretion as to whether to issue injunctions under the
Controlled Substances Act, in part because "criminal enforcement is an alternative, and
indeed the customary, means of ensuring compliance").
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statutes that lack such alternatives. 83 A statutory declaration
that courts should issue injunctions 'in accordance with the
principles of equity,"' however, bolsters the presumption that a
particular provision requires equitable balancing.84 Applying its
clear statement rule, the Court has required equitable balancing
to determine the propriety of injunctive relief under laws
including the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,85 FWPCA, 86
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA),87
NEPA,88 Patent Act,89 Controlled Substances Act,90 and the
Copyright Act. 91
Conversely, in a few cases, the Supreme Court has found
Congress's intent sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption
of equitable discretion over injunctive relief. For example, in
United States v City and County of San Francisco,92 the Court
held that a court need not engage in equitable balancing before
issuing an injunction under the Raker Act. 93 The Act granted
the City and County of San Francisco various lands and rights-
of-way in Yosemite National Park and Stanislaus National
Forest to allow the city to build and operate facilities for
supplying water and electricity, but prohibited the City from
transferring any of those rights to a private person or
corporation.94 San Francisco violated this condition by allowing
a private utility to sell and distribute power generated through
the land grants. 95 The Supreme Court held that the Government
was entitled to an injunction to enforce the Raker Act's
"' See Amoco, 480 US at 543 n 8.
84 eBay, 547 US at 392, quoting 35 USC § 283.
"' Pub L No 77-421, § 205(a), 56 Stat 23, 33 (1942), codified at 50 USC § 901 et seq;
see Hecht, 321 US at 328-29.
1 33 USC § 1251. See Weinberger, 456 US at 306-07.
87 16 USC § 3120. See Amoco, 480 US at 534.
42 USC § 4332. See Monsanto, 561 US at 156-58; Winter, 555 US at 20-23.
89 35 USC § 283. See eBay, 547 US at 391.
90 21 USC §§ 841(a), 882(a). See Oakland Cannabis, 532 US at 497-98.
91 17 USC § 501. See Dun u Lumberman's Credit Association, 209 US 20, 23 (1908)
(holding that, even though the plaintiff had established copyright infringement, the
lower court "wisely exercised" its discretion "in refusing an injunction and remitting the
appellants to a court of law to recover such damage as they might there prove that they
had sustained"). See also Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569, 578 n 10 (1994).
92 310 US 16 (1940).
93 Raker Act, Pub L No 63-41, § 6, 38 Stat 242, 245 (1913).
94 Raker Act §§ 1, 6, 38 Stat at 242.
95 San Francisco, 310 US at 30-31.
192 [ 2014
ENFORCING EQUALITY
restrictions without equitable balancing.96 Automatic injunctive
relief was "both appropriate and necessary" to "enforce
covenants [that Congress] exacted from a grantee of rights" and
make Congress's "declared polic[ies] ... effective."97
Likewise, in Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill,98 the Court
held that §§ 7 and 11(g) of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
require courts to enjoin any federal activities that jeopardize the
existence of, or would modify or destroy a habitat that is critical
for, an endangered species.99 Section 11(g) provides that a
plaintiff may sue "to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency
... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
[Act]."100 The Court held that the ESA reflects Congress's clear
intent to require automatic injunctive relief. 101
The majority explained, "Congress has spoken in the
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance
has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the
highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described
as 'institutionalized caution."' 102 It concluded that allowing
courts to "strik[e] a balance of equities" and decide for
themselves whether injunctive relief "accords with common
sense and the public weal" would "pre-empt [this] congressional
action." 103 Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the
ESA's remedial provisions do not reveal any congressional intent
to strip courts of their traditional discretion to determine
whether to enjoin statutory violations. 104 It appears that lower
96 Id (holding that the Raker Act "does not call for a balancing of equities or for the
invocation of the generalities of judicial maxims in order to determine whether an
injunction should have issued").
97 Id.
98 437 US 153 (1978).
99 Id at 194-95 (discussing 16 USC §§ 1536, 1540(g)).
1oo 16 USC § 1540(g)(1)(A).
101 Hill, 437 US at 193-94.
102 Id at 194.
'os Id at 194-95 (quotation marks omitted).
104 Id at 211 (Rehnquist dissenting). Elsewhere, the Court similarly held that, in
passing the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 USC § 178, which allows
courts to enjoin industry-wide strikes that "imperil the national ... safety," id, Congress
did not "intend[] that the issuance of injunctions should depend upon judicial inquiries"
about the propriety of such relief. United Steelworkers, 361 US at 41. Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, agreed that "[t]he purpose of Congress expressed
by [the LMRA]" precludes courts from exercising "ordinary equitable discretion" or
"balancing conveniences" in deciding whether to issue injunctions. Id at 55-56
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courts have been somewhat more willing than the Supreme
Court to find statutory language sufficiently clear to overcome
the traditional presumption of judicial discretion to grant
statutory injunctions. 105
C. Academic Approaches to Statutory Injunctions
Commentators have debated whether and when courts
should have equitable discretion to decline to issue statutory
injunctions. Many scholars, accepting eBay's four-factor
balancing test, argue that courts applying it should be more
sensitive to the goals of the statutes being enforced. 106 Others
contend that certain elements of the eBay standard should be
deemed automatically satisfied when a plaintiff seeks a
(Frankfurter concurring). Rather, an "injunctive remedy ... [is] commanded as a matter
of policy by Congress." Id at 56. It does not appear that the LMRA was written with the
specificity now required by Weinberger, eBay, and even Hill. It provides only that a court
'shall have jurisdiction to enjoin' any "'industry-wide strike [that] threatens national
defense,"' and to "'make such other orders as may be appropriate."' Id at 40, quoting 29
USC § 178. Read in light of later cases, this delegation of authority does not suggest that
Congress intended to remove courts' equitable discretion concerning injunctive relief. See
note 80. Moreover, the Act's creation of alternate remedies, permitting courts to issue
"other such orders as may be appropriate," 29 USC § 178, bolsters the notion that
injunctive relief is not mandatory. See note 82. Justice Douglas made many of these
points in his dissent, arguing that, 'i n situations no more clouded with doubt than the
present one[,] we have refused to read a statutory authority to issue a decree as a
command to do it." United Steelworkers, 361 US at 72 (Douglas dissenting).
10 See, for example, Joshua A. u Rocklin Unified School District, 559 F3d 1036, 1037
(9th Cir 2009) (holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USC
§ 1415(j), entitles plaintiffs to automatic interim relief without "show[ing] the
traditionally required factors"); CBS Broadcasting, Inc v EchoStar Communications
Corp, 450 F3d 505, 527 n 32 (11th Cir 2006) (holding that the Satellite Home Viewer Act
of 1988, 17 USC § 119, reveals "congressional intent" to require the issuance of
injunctive relief without applying "traditional equitable principles"). See also City of New
York v Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc, 597 F3d 115, 120-21 (2d Cir 2010) (holding that
government agencies are entitled to a preliminary injunction under the Contraband
Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18 USC § 2341, and the Cigarette Marketing Standards Act,
NY Tax L § 483, based solely on a showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits).
106 See, for example, Daniel Mach, Rules Without Reasons: The Diminishing Role of
Statutory Policy and Equitable Discretion in the Law of NEPA Remedies, 35 Harv Envir
L Rev 205, 236 (2011) (arguing that appellate courts should "tailor[] the normal
equitable requirements for injunctive relief to account for the particularities of NEPA's
mandate to protect environmental review procedures"); Avalyn Taylor, Rethinking the
Irreparable Harm Factor in Wildlife Mortality Cases, 2 Stan J Animal L & Pol 113, 134
(2009) ("[C]ourts should look to the primary goals of a given statute to define the scope
and nature of the harm to be considered in the irreparable harm analysis."); Leslye A.
Herrmann, Comment, Injunctions for NEPA Violations: Balancing the Equities, 59 U Chi
L Rev 1263, 1287 (1992) ("[C]ourts should grant injunctions to prevent the harm that a
statute was designed to combat" and "incorporat[e] [the statute's] scheme and purpose in
the balancing process.").
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statutory injunction. 107 One intriguing piece advocates that
equitable relief be based on a system of presumptions, such as a
rebuttable presumption that violations of certain duties or laws
cause irreparable harm, and "safety valves," rather than ad hoc
judicial balancing. 108
Many scholars argue that courts should be presumptively
required to issue injunctions to remedy statutory violations,
denying them only under certain specified circumstances. Doug
Rendleman, for example, contends that "a substantively
successful plaintiff's default remedy ought to be an injunction,
prima facie, if the plaintiff wants one."109 The eBay factors, he
adds, should be available as affirmative defenses a defendant
may assert to defeat injunctive relief. 110
David Schoenbrod, in contrast, believes that eBay's four-
factor test gives courts too much policymaking authority.111 He
maintains that a court should have discretion to decline to issue
a statutory injunction only if "(a) different relief is consistent
with the goals of the statute and (b) the case involves a factor
justifying departure from the statutory rule that was not
reflected in its formulation." 1 12 Ronald M. Levin similarly
concludes that "a court may not rely on equity to repudiate a
107 78 Harv L Rev at 1059 (cited in note 59) (approving of courts that "issue a
preliminary injunction without requiring a showing of irreparable injury" where "a
statute forbids conduct with which the plaintiff is threatened," because the choice
between damages and injunctive relief should be based on "careful study in each case,
rather than as a ... general preference for damage relief"); Comment, 57 Yale L J at
1024 (cited in note 36) ("[L]egislative provision for an injunction liberates the remedy
from many of the bonds of equity by satisfying of itself conditions which the Chancellor
would otherwise require to be established in each case.").
108 Gergen, Golden, and Smith, 112 Colum L Rev at 220-26 (cited in note 26). One
case note offers an equally creative suggestion, contending that courts should exercise
equitable discretion when a government agency seeks an injunction to enforce a federal
law, to "allow[ ] for a check and balance upon [the agency] rather than ... giv[ing]
agencies complete control." Leecia D. Carnes, Case Note, Agency Power v Court
Discretion: Should Courts Have the Discretion to Not Enforce Injunctive Relief
Recommended by Statutes?: United States v Mass. Water Res. Auth., 9 Mo Envir L & Pol
Rev 96, 104 (2002).
109 Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge's Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 Rev Litig 63, 87 (2007). His argument applies to all injunctions, not
just those issued as a result of a statutory violation.
110 Id at 87. Rendleman also believes that the "irreparable harm" and "inadequate
remedy at law" factors are duplicative. Id.
n. David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn L Rev 627 (1988).
112 Id at 647.
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statutory objective outright." 113 It may decline to issue an
injunction only if a violation "is expected to be temporary, the
requirement being violated is merely a means to an ultimate
statutory purpose, the defendant's impairment of that
underlying purpose is minimal or nonexistent, and the costs to
the defendant of complying with the injunction would be
high."114
Several authors reject even the limited level of judicial
discretion over statutory injunctions that Rendleman,
Schoenbrod, Levin, and others defend. In his seminal article on
this issue, Zygmunt J.B. Plater explains that, while a court may
exercise discretion in adjudicating equitable defenses or
determining the exact scope of a remedy,1 15 it lacks "discretion
or authority to exercise equitable powers so as to permit
violations of statutes to continue,"116 even if a violation is
technical, minor, or would result in great public benefit. 117 When
a statute is violated, a court may refuse to issue an injunction
only if it is confident that such relief is unnecessary to ensure
that the defendant complies with the statute in the future.11 8
Gene Shreve similarly concludes that courts should issue
injunctions as a matter of course when statutes are violated, at
least if such violations are likely to continue. 119 Particularly
when a government entity seeks an injunction, performing
equitable balancing requires courts to "second-guess[]" and
"question[] the judgment of another branch of the federal
government" about whether irreparable harm will occur or other
remedies are adequate. 120 Jared A. Goldstein echoes this
ns Levin, 53 Duke L J at 340 (cited in note 56).
114 Id.
n1 Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 526, 568 (cited in note 26).
n1 Id at 525-26. See also id at 527 ("When a court in equity is confronted on the
merits with a continuing violation of statutory law, it has no discretion or authority to
balance the equities so as to permit that violation to continue."); id at 533.
117 Id at 526-27.
11 Id at 528. Allowing courts to decline to enjoin statutory violations based on
equitable balancing, he contends, empowers them to effectively amend legislation. Id at
527. It is the legislature's role to enact any necessary amendments or exceptions to
overbroad or even harmful laws. Id at 528.
119 Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 405 (cited in note 26). See also Fregeau, 18 BC
Envir Affairs L Rev at 503 (cited in note 28) ([F]ederal courts do not have the discretion
to balance the equities when violations of statute occur. If the law has been violated, and
if those violations likely will continue, then an injunction against those violations must
issue.").
120 Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 402-03 (cited in note 26).
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sentiment, arguing that "balancing the equities in statutory
cases violates separation-of-powers principles" by allowing
courts to exercise the essentially legislative power "to choose
among competing federal policies." 121 Owen Fiss, another well-
known advocate of injunctive relief, extols the special utility of
injunctions in civil rights cases. 12 2
Finally, still other scholars reject the notion that a single
standard should apply to statutory injunctions, and contend
instead that the proper test depends on the statute at issue.
Most notably, Daniel Farber, emphasizing the importance of
implementing congressional intent, 123 contends that when a
statute imposes an absolute duty that a person must obey, a
court automatically should issue injunctions to prevent
violations. 124 When it imposes only a qualified duty, requiring a
person to use "best efforts" to comply, the court may engage in
equitable balancing. 125 John Leubsdorf's influential article
concerning the standard for preliminary injunctions contends
more generally that, "[s]ometimes, when the legislature has
found transcendent value in the interests it is protecting, a
plaintiff demonstrating irreparable injury should automatically
receive relief unless extraordinary harm faces the defendants.
But glib assumptions that all statutory injunctions are alike
should be avoided." 1 26
This Article suggests a different approach. Like Farber and
Leubsdorf, it rejects the notion that a single, consistent standard
should apply to all statutory injunctions. Rather than varying
based on the law being enforced, however, it suggests that the
standard for statutory injunctions should depend instead on the
nature of the order the plaintiff seeks. 127
121 dared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 Va L Rev 485,
516-17 (2010).
122 See generally Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (Indiana 1978).
123 Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U Pitt L Rev 513, 515 (1984).
124 Id at 537-38.
121 Id. He urges that any doubts be resolved in favor of automatic equitable relief, at
least under environmental statutes. Id at 542-44. Michael Axline makes a similar
argument, although based on a different, more complex statutory taxonomy. Michael D.
Axline, Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies in
Environmental Cases, 12 Harv Envir L Rev 1 (1988).
126 Leubsdorf, 91 Harv L Rev at 563 (cited in note 26).
127 See Part III.
177] 197
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
II. EQUITABLE BALANCING AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Supreme Court doctrine concerning equitable balancing, as
synthesized and reaffirmed in eBay,128 raises a range of
questions that the Court has yet to address about the
availability of injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act, 129 as
well as other laws which incorporate its remedial provisions,130
such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 131 The Court
has recognized that "[t]he fashioning of appropriate remedies"
under the Civil Rights Act "invokes the sound equitable
discretion of the district courts" 132 yet, as described below, also
has expressed a strong preference for making remedies under
the Act broadly available. 133
The Supreme Court has never specifically considered the
availability of injunctions under the Act, but its rulings
concerning attorneys' fees and backpay are instructive. In 1968,
only a few years after the Act's passage, the Court held that a
plaintiff who obtains an injunction under Title II "should
ordinarily recover . . . attorney's fee [s] unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." 134 Declaring
that "[a] Title II suit is ... private in form only," the Court
explained, "When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title,
he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does
so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,'
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority." 135 Making attorneys' fees widely available to successful
litigants, the Court reasoned, would encourage potential
128 547 US at 394.
129 Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat 241.
"s See, for example, 42 USC § 2000a-3(a).
.s See, for example, 42 USC § 12188(a)(1).
132 Franks v Bowman Transportation Co, Inc, 424 US 747, 770 (1976).
lB Four Justices, in a concurring opinion, arguably went even further, stating that
when a defendant violates Title VII, "an injunction concerning future conduct ordinarily
is, and should therefore be routinely awarded once liability is established." Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v
Norris, 463 US 1073, 1092 (1983) (Marshall concurring). Alex Reinert points out that,
although the Court professes a preference for injunctive relief in civil rights cases,
plaintiffs often are unable to obtain injunctions due to barriers such as standing,
mootness, and limits on attorneys fees. Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights
Litigation and the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L Rev 931, 935-36, 943-45
(2010).
134 Newman u Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc, 390 US at 402, 402 (1968).
ls. Id at 401-02.
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plaintiffs "to advance the public interest by invoking the
injunctive powers of the federal courts." 1 36
A few years later, in the 1975 case Albemarle Paper Co v
Moody, 1 37 the Court considered the standard for backpay awards
under Title VII. It affirmed that backpay "is not an automatic or
mandatory remedy; like all other remedies under the Act, it is
one which the courts 'may' invoke." 138 Courts must exercise their
discretion, however, in light of the Act's "'large objectives,'
which include combatting "a historic evil of national
proportions." 1 39 Backpay awards further those objectives by
deterring discrimination and compensating victims. 14 0
"Where racial discrimination is concerned," Albemarle
elaborated, a court "'has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future."'14 1 The Court explained that
"[i]mportant national goals would be frustrated by a regime of
discretion that 'produce[d] different results for breaches of duty
in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy."' 142 it
concluded that "backpay should be denied only for reasons
which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central
statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through
past discrimination." 143
In later cases, the Court recognized that "[t]he Albemarle
presumption in favor of retroactive liability can seldom be
overcome," yet insisted that it "does not make meaningless the
district courts' duty to determine that such relief is
appropriate."14 4 Indeed, it has occasionally found that
1s6 Id at 402.
1s7 422 US 405 (1975).
1s8 Id at 415, quoting 42 USC § 2000e-5(g).
19 Albemarle, 422 US at 416, quoting Hecht, 321 US at 331.
140 Albemarle, 422 US at 418.
141 Id, quoting Louisiana v United States, 380 US 145, 154 (1965).
142 Albemarle, 422 US at 417, quoting Moragne u States Marine Lines, 398 US 375,
405 (1970).
143 Albemarle, 422 US at 421. See also Norris, 463 US at 1092 ("Absent special
circumstances a victim of a Title VII violation is entitled to whatever retroactive relief is
necessary to undo any damage resulting from the violation.").
144 City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power u Manhart, 435 US 702, 719
(1978).
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defendants have overcome Albemarle's strong presumption in
favor of backpay. In City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power v Manhart,14 5 the Court held that a city violated Title
VII by requiring female employees, because of their longer
actuarial lifespans, to contribute more to a pension fund than
male employees. 14 6 The Court nevertheless held that the district
court's order requiring restitution of all the "excess" premiums
that female employees had paid into the system was
erroneous. 147
The Court explained that, prior to its ruling, a reasonable
pension administrator could have assumed that such premium
differentials were lawful, or even that it would have been illegal
to make male employees effectively subsidize women by
charging both genders the same rates.14 8 Awarding backpay
therefore was unnecessary to ensure that other administrators
would change their policies to comply with the ruling.14 9
Moreover, retroactively applying the court's ruling through
backpay awards could jeopardize pension funds' solvency and
insureds' benefits. 150 The "devastating" effect that a remedial
order could have on "innocent third parties" made the district
court's backpay order improper. 151 Thus, while Albemarle's
strong presumption of backpay is not absolute, Manhart's
standard for overcoming it is extraordinarily high, focusing
primarily on whether such relief would have widespread adverse
effects on third parties, rather than the litigants themselves. 152
Lower courts have adopted a range of approaches in
determining whether to grant injunctions under the Civil Rights
Act. Many of those cases overlook not only the general standards
governing statutory injunctions, but also the Court's rulings
addressing other forms of relief under the Act. Some courts
simply ignore the eBay factors and mechanically award
14' 435 US 702 (1978).
146 Id at 716-17.
147 Id at 723.
148 Manhart, 435 US at 719-20.
149 Id at 720-21.
"s Id at 721.
m. Id at 722-23.
112 See, for example, Norris, 463 US at 1092 (holding that "there are no special
circumstances justifying the denial of retroactive relief" against pension funds that paid
female public employees lower benefits than male employees based on premiums
collected after Manhart).
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injunctions to successful plaintiffs,153 while others have
expressly held that those factors are inapplicable154 without
engaging in the analysis the Supreme Court requires. 155 The
Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that a successful Title VII
plaintiff need not satisfy the eBay factors to obtain injunctive
relief, but rather is entitled to an injunction so long as the
"'discriminatory conduct could possibly persist in the
future"' 15 6-an issue that goes to standing rather than equitable
considerations. 157
Other courts purport to apply the eBay factors (or the
Winter factors, in the preliminary injunction context), but hold
that most or all of them are presumptively satisfied, or even
satisfied as a matter of law, in Civil Rights Act cases158-
seemingly in tension with eBay's express repudiation of such
..s See, for example, EEOC v Pacific Press Publishing Association, 535 F2d 1182,
1187 (9th Cir 1976) (holding that Title VII "mandates the grant of a preliminary
injunct[ion] whenever the EEOC seeks it under § 2000e-5(f)(2) so long as its procedural
requirements are met"). See also Reiter v MTA New York City Transit Authority, 457 F3d
224, 230 (2d Cir 2006); Board of Education of City School District of City of New York v
Harris, 622 F2d 599, 614-15 (2d Cir 1980).
134 See, for example, United States v City of New York, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 95083,
*13 (EDNY) ("Consistent with the statutory language and congressional intent, those
powers [to issue injunctions] are activated as soon as a Title VII violation is established,
rather than upon a further showing of injury or a weighing of hardships and the public
interest."); O'Sullican v City of Chicago, 478 F Supp 2d 1034, 1043 (ND Ill 2007) ("Once
a Title VII violation has been shown, district courts have broad discretion to issue
injunctions addressed to the proven conduct."). Compare with Long v Coast Resorts, Inc,
267 F3d 918, 923 (9th Cir 2001) (holding that "there is no room for discretion" to deny
injunctive relief when a resort's ADA violations "resulted in the very discrimination the
statute seeks to prevent"); United States u Wood, 295 F2d 772, 784 (5th Cir 1961)
(holding that the irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law requirements do not
apply to injunctions against violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 USC § 1971).
1.. See Section I.B.
16 O'Sullican, 478 F Supp 2d at 1043, quoting Miles v Indiana, 387 F3d 591, 601
(7th Cir 2004). See also EEOC v Autozone, Inc, 707 F3d 824, 840 (7th Cir 2013); Bruso v
United Airlines, Inc, 239 F3d 848, 864 (7th Cir 2001).
137 Compare with Lyons, 461 US at 104.
138 See, for example, Jean-Baptiste v District of Columbia, 958 F Supp 2d 37, 49 n 15
(DDC 2013) ("[T]he four-factor test would appear to be satisfied in any Title VII case in
which a verdict is rendered for the plaintiff."); EEOC v DCP Midstream, LP, 608 F Supp
2d 107, 110 (D Me 2009) ("[A] finding of liability, coupled with Title VII's congressional
endorsement of equitable relief, is sufficient to meet the first three prongs of the [eBay]
test. The fourth prong is likewise met because . .. the public has an interest in the
enforcement of federal statutes.") (quotation marks omitted). See also Silver Sage
Partners, Ltd v City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F3d 814, 827 (9th Cir 2001); Gergen,
Golden, and Smith, 112 Colum L Rev at 231 (cited in note 26) ("Irreparable injury is
generally presumed for violations of civil rights without question.").
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presumptions and categorical rules. 15 9 Some cases instead
conclusorily declare that the plaintiff is required to establish
only some of the eBay factors, 160 while still others affirm that the
factors apply, but find it unnecessary to address them for
various reasons based on the posture of the case. 161
Very few of the courts that require plaintiffs in Civil Rights
Act cases to satisfy eBay's requirements for injunctive relief
have offered sustained explanations of how those factors apply
in the civil rights context. 162 The Western District of
Pennsylvania, affirming eBay's applicability, 1 63 has suggested
that it would not treat them as merely pro forma:
The court simply cannot agree with plaintiff's argument
that in every Title VII case in which a plaintiff prevails
on a claim a permanent injunction should issue against
the employer. If the court were to follow that reasoning,
the standard for obtaining injunctive relief would be
eviscerated. An injunction may be appropriate relief in
Title VII cases where entitlement to such relief is
proven. 164
One example of a court relying on eBay's non-merits
requirements to deny injunctive relief under the Civil Rights
159 See eBay, 547 US at 393. See also Monsanto, 561 US at 157-158.
160 See, for example, Rose u Cahee, 727 F Supp 2d 728, 740 (ED Wis 2010) (holding
that, to obtain a permanent injunction under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate
the absence of an adequate remedy at law, but not irreparable harm). Compare with
Gebru u Sears, Roebuck & Co, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 77283, *10 (ND Tex) (holding that
irreparable injury is required for an injunction to issue in a Title II case).
161 See, for example, Gonzalez u National Board of Medical Examiners, 225 F3d 620,
632 (6th Cir 2000) (holding, in an ADA case, that because "Plaintiff has no likelihood of
success on the merits, we need not consider whether he would otherwise be entitled to a
preliminary injunction"); Vasich u City of Chicago, 2013 US Dist LEXIS 1740, *26-29
(ND Ill) (appearing to accept the applicability of the eBay factors while concluding that
the plaintiff's ability to satisfy them "is an open question that is not before the Court at
this stage"). See also Lyninger u Motsinger, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 116802, *2-3 (D Nev)
(ADA case); Civil Service Employees Association u New York State Department of Parks,
Recreation and Historic Preservation, 689 F Supp 2d 267, 276-77 (NDNY 2010).
162 For examples of the more substantive discussions, see, for example, United States
u City of New York, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 111064, *28-31 (EDNY); McElroy v Simon
Property Group, Inc, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 69622, *17-23 (D Kan). See also Pashby v
Delia, 709 F3d 307, 329-31 (4th Cir 2013) (applying Winter standard to preliminary
injunction under the ADA); Jones u National Conference of Bar Examiners, 801 F Supp
2d 270, 286-91 (D Vt 2011) (same).
1s Prise v Alderwoods Group, Inc, 2010 US Dist LEXIS 89857, *10 (WD Pa).
164 Id at *13.
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Act's remedial provisions (albeit in the ADA context) is the
Fourth Circuit's ruling in A Helping Hand, LLC v Baltimore
County.165 After a methodone clinic opened in a residential area,
the county passed an ordinance prohibiting medical clinics from
operating within 750 feet of a residence. 166 The trial court
determined that the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause
and enjoined the County from enforcing it for two years. 167 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that "the injunction cannot
stand" because "[t]he Clinic has not demonstrated that it will
suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction." 168 The court
expressly rejected the contention that constitutional violations
"per se constitute[] irreparable harm."169 Although the
ordinance "could require the Clinic to relocate," which would
''result in some costs and inconvenience for the Clinic," the court
concluded that such injury was not irreparable and "money
damages could compensate any cost to the Clinic."170
It is unclear how the Supreme Court's early line of Civil
Rights Act cases should be reconciled with its subsequent
holdings on statutory injunctions. eBay supports a two-tier
approach to statutory injunctions, under which courts should
presumptively apply its four-factor-test to decide whether to
award injunctive relief, 171 unless Congress clearly and
unequivocally removes that discretion by requiring courts to
automatically award injunctions to prevailing plaintiffs. 172
The Supreme Court's early Civil Rights Act cases suggest
that a third alternative could be added to this framework, under
which courts would make injunctions more widely available
under laws such as the Civil Rights Act, without requiring that
they be automatically awarded. 173 A court could implement such
an intermediate approach in a variety of ways, including
relieving a plaintiff from having to establish certain eBay
16 355 F Appx 773 (4th Cir 2009).
166 Id at 774.
167 Id at 775.
16s Id at 776.
169 A Helping Hand, 355 F Appx at 777.
170 Id at 776.
171 See Section I.A.
172 See Section I.B. As discussed above, the Court has applied loose and inconsistent
standards over the years in deciding whether Congress has manifested such intent
clearly enough. Id.
17s See notes 134-143 and accompanying text.
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factors, or assuming they are met as a matter of law; holding a
plaintiff to a lower burden of proof in determining whether each
factor is satisfied; resolving any doubts in the plaintiff's favor; or
treating the eBay factors as affirmative defenses that a
defendant must prove in order to defeat injunctive relief.174
Courts even could extend Albemarle by awarding injunctive
relief whenever the Civil Rights Act makes it available, except
in very rare cases where it would cause unfair, substantial,
widespread harm to third parties.17 5
Tipping the scales in favor of injunctive relief by adopting
any of these possible "middle tier" approaches in certain cases
raises difficulties, because eBay emphatically rejected the notion
that injunctive relief should be presumptively available for
statutory violations.176 More generally, a tripartite framework
for statutory injunctions also would exacerbate the challenges
courts face in discerning congressional intent. Rather than
applying a clear statement rule (or some vaguely-defined
variation of one177) to determine whether a statute requires
automatic injunctive relief, a court would have to parse the
statute's text and legislative history even more closely to
determine whether such relief is intended to be automatic, as in
TVA v Hill;178 strongly presumptive under Albemarle;179 or
instead determined based on the traditional equitable principles
set forth in eBay. 180 In most cases, Congress is unlikely to have
discussed, much less expressly and definitively agreed upon, this
issue with such granularity.
Any such remedial trichotomy also would exacerbate a
related problem that arises from courts' implementation of
current doctrine. Many courts-including the Supreme Court-
purport to apply a clear statement rule to decide whether they
may exercise equitable discretion to deny statutory injunctions,
yet in practice often base their decisions on their own
assessment of whether a statutory purpose is sufficiently
174 See notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
17' Albemarle, 422 US at 421.
176 See notes 33-34.
177 See notes 78-84.
17s 437 US 153 (1978). See notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
179 Albemarle, 422 US at 421.
1s0 547 US at 391, 393-94. See, for example, Weinberger, 456 US at 306-07 (1982)
(pre-eBay case denying injunctive relief based on traditional factors).
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important to warrant automatic injunctive relief.181 This
approach puts courts in the awkward and inappropriate position
of making quintessentially political choices, rather than
engaging in statutory interpretation. Allowing courts to
categorize each statute in three possible ways, rather than only
two, increases the likelihood of subjective, inconsistent, and
unpredictable decisionmaking.
It is tempting to treat civil rights and anti-discrimination
statutes as sui generis and endorse the creation of a special
remedial category for them, but there is not an objective,
predictable, and defensible way to determine the laws, or types
of laws, to which any such category would be limited. Plaintiffs
can credibly claim to be protecting incommensurable,
fundamentally important public interests in many other types of
disputes, such as environmental or constitutional cases. Indeed,
courts have been willing to treat federal laws other than civil
rights statutes as transcendentally important, 182  while
paradoxically subjecting plaintiffs in constitutional cases to the
eBay test.183 It seems inappropriate for the judiciary to attempt
to classify the relative importance of various federal statutes or
constitutional provisions.
Another concern about a tripartite approach is that it adds
an additional level of analysis and complexity to courts'
decisionmaking without necessarily providing any marginal
benefit beyond eBay's four-factor test. eBay's irreparable injury,
balance-of-hardships, and public interest factors already allow
courts to consider the nature of the rights and interests that a
statute protects. It is unnecessary to require courts to also take
such considerations into account in deciding, as a threshold
matter, whether to apply some sort of modified or heightened
181 See, for example, Hill, 437 US at 193-95.
182 Id at 194-95 (enjoining operation of a newly constructed $78 million dam to
protect the endangered snail darter, because the ESA makes protecting "endangered
species the highest of priorities").
1ss See, for example, Lyons, 461 US at 111; Younger, 401 US at 44-45. The Court
arguably has modified the eBay standard in certain constitutional cases, however, by
holding that " [t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 373 (1976).
One commentator contends that the most plausible explanation for this holding is that
'courts fear that close scrutiny of irreparable injury will reveal numerous instances
where constitutional violations are virtually harmless." Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell to
Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Litigation, 35 Harv J L
& Pub Pol 743, 746 (2012).
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variation of the eBay standard. Thus, despite the facially
persuasive case for adopting a tripartite approach to statutory
injunctions, or even extending Albemarle to all injunctions
under the Civil Rights Act, the theoretical and doctrinal
drawbacks strongly counsel against it. Part III of this Article,
however, proposes an alternate approach to statutory
injunctions that can be applied in any context, including cases
under the Civil Rights Act.
III. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS
This Part proposes a new approach for determining whether
a court should grant a statutory injunction to a plaintiff who has
proven her case on the merits. As under current law, a court
should automatically grant an injunction when a statute
expressly and unequivocally requires it to do so. In deciding
whether a law mandates injunctive relief, however, the court
should focus solely on whether it is drafted in mandatory terms,
rather than attempting to assess the law's perceived importance
or otherwise infer Congress's implicit intent. 184
For laws that simply authorize injunctive relief without
affirmatively mandating it, the standard that a court should
apply depends on the nature of the restrictions it is considering.
Broadly speaking, provisions in injunctions can be classified into
two broad categories (remedial and prospective),185 and further
divided into four specific types:
(i) remedial orders for non-monetary relief: A court
should grant a plaintiff's request for a non-monetary
remedial order, if possible, unless the combined burden
or harm that such an order would cause for the defendant
and third parties would overwhelmingly outweigh the
benefit to the plaintiff.
184 Compare with Hill, 437 US 194-95; United Steelworkers, 361 US at 55-56; San
Francisco, 310 US at 30-31.
1ss This Article's definitions for these categories are crafted to avoid the
shortcomings of the way in which the Supreme Court has distinguished between
retrospective and prospective relief under the Eleventh Amendment. See Edelman v
Jordan, 415 US 651, 677 (1974). See, for example, John M. Greabe, Constitutional
Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 Wm & Mary Bill of Rights J 857, 864 n 42
(2013); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L J 1, 88 n 353 (1988).
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(ii) remedial orders for monetary relief: Requests for
remedial orders requiring the payment of money should
be treated as actions for compensatory damages.
(iii) prospective orders that prohibit statutory violations:
When a successful plaintiff has standing to seek
prospective relief, a court should enjoin repeated,
ongoing, or impending statutory violations, either
directly, by reference to the statute itself, or indirectly, by
prohibiting conduct that the court has held violates that
statute. The court should consider the propriety of
enforcing the injunction during subsequent contempt
proceedings. Congress, however, should avoid authorizing
prospective injunctions as remedies, and instead make
contempt-type remedies directly available for statutory
violations.
(iv) prospective prophylactic orders: Courts should
decline to issue purely prophylactic injunctions that
purport to prohibit conduct that is not otherwise illegal.
A proposed order may be comprised of provisions of different
types; each should be considered separately under the
appropriate standard.
This proposed framework seeks to serve several main
functions. Primarily, it offers a way of eliminating anachronistic
equitable doctrines, many of which result in arbitrary or
substantively undesirable results in the modern era. Just as
importantly, the framework attempts to protect separation of
powers, by ensuring that courts do not usurp the legislative
function. Finally, it seeks to promote justice, by providing
protection and relief for victims of statutory violations, while
preserving enough judicial flexibility to allow courts to ensure
that the relief granted is appropriate to the circumstances of
each case. The recommended changes may be accomplished
through judicial rulings and revisions to current doctrine, but
could be greatly aided by legislation. 186
186 Professor Rendleman briefly mentioned and dismissed the possibility that eBay's
equitable balancing requirements might stem from Article III and therefore "cannot be
abrogated except by constitutional decisions or constitutional amendment." Doug
Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 Mich L Rev 1642, 1665 (1992).
Professor Shreve likewise suggested that Congress may not "usurp the federal courts'
power to decide when to issue injunctions." Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 399 (cited in
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A. Remedial Provisions
Remedial provisions in injunctions attempt to rectify harm
that a plaintiff suffered prior to the court's judgment, but do not
otherwise attempt to prevent future statutory violations or
protect the plaintiff's rights against subsequent abridgement. By
definition, a remedial injunction may be awarded only after a
statutory violation has occurred; remedial injunctions generally
may not be awarded in pre-enforcement challenges or other
lawsuits based on impending or threatened harms. A provision
requiring backpay for a victim of employment discrimination
would be remedial, for example, because it concerns funds that
the plaintiff already has been denied in violation of federal law.
Reinstatement, in contrast, would not be considered remedial,
but rather "prospective"187 because such an order would concern
the defendant's future compliance with Title VII.
Remedial orders may be further broken down into two self-
explanatory sub-categories: monetary and non-monetary. Other
commentators have argued that remedies instead should be
classified as either specific or substitutionary. 188 "Specific"
remedies seek to "prevent harm to [the] plaintiff, repair the
harm in kind, or restore the specific thing that [the] plaintiff
lost."18 9 "Substitutionary" remedies, in contrast, provide the
plaintiff money to compensate for harm that the plaintiff
suffered. 190
Although this traditional distinction is compelling, it raises
unnecessary complications regarding the proper classification of
note 26). Professor Plater persuasively rejects that view, finding it "difficult to argue that
legislatures could not, if they desired to do so and did so explicitly and unequivocally,
take over the entire field of a court's equitable discretion . .. in a statute-based action."
Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 553 n 112 (cited in note 26).
187 A strong argument could be made that an order restoring an employee to a job
that she was denied due to illegal discrimination is a type of remedial order, since it
aims to put the employee in the same position she would have occupied, had the
defendant not violated the law in the first place. This Article contends that there are
important distinctions between remedying past statutory violations and preventing
future ones, however, which would be obfuscated by classifying such an essentially
forward-looking injunction as "remedial." Nevertheless, disagreements at the margins
regarding the category into which certain types of orders should be placed do not
necessarily undermine the validity of the categories themselves or this Article's overall
recommended framework.





orders requiring "restitution of a specific sum of money." 191 A
monetary award may be considered either "specific" or
"substitutionary," depending on the plaintiff's precise cause of
action and the label she assigns to the relief she seeks (for
example, whether she sues for compensatory damages, reliance
damages, restitution, or disgorgement). Thus, under some
circumstances, a monetary remedy is treated as compensatory
damages (a remedy at law), whereas other times it is the object
of an injunction. Classifying relief as either monetary or non-
monetary captures the benefits of the specific-substitutionary
distinction while avoiding some of the difficulties and
arbitrariness that arise from that dichotomy's inconsistent
treatment of monetary relief. 192
Courts should apply a heavily modified form of eBay's
requirements when considering provisions in injunctions
requiring non-monetary remedial relief. They should award such
relief, if possible, unless the aggregate burden or harm the order
would cause for the defendants and third parties would
overwhelmingly outweigh the benefit to the plaintiffs.
Conversely, when a statute allows a plaintiff to seek an
injunction ordering the payment of money, the court should
treat the claim as an action for compensatory damages.
1. Eliminating the irreparable injury and inadequate
remedy at law factors for non-monetary relief.
Most basically, a plaintiff should not have to satisfy eBay's
irreparable injury or inadequate remedy at law requirements to
obtain an injunction. As Owen Fiss points out, these factors
effectively establish a hierarchy of remedies in which injunctions
occupy a disfavored position.193 Compensatory damages-
money-are regarded as the default remedy; a plaintiff
generally may obtain injunctive relief only if such damages (a
"remedy at law") are unavailable or unreasonably difficult to
calculate.1 94
191 Id.
192 See Subsection III.A3.
193 Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction at 38 (cited in note 122).
194 Douglas Laycock has famously argued that the irreparable injury rule has been
drastically undermined, because courts are willing to find that it has been satisfied
under a range of other circumstances, as well. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death
of the Irreparable Injury Rule (Oxford 1991).
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Whatever the merits of this approach for common-law
causes of action, it is particularly inappropriate for statutory
violations. Congress generally prohibits conduct to attempt to
prevent it from occurring, and to protect certain rights and
interests. And laws typically are not understood as giving people
a choice between complying with a prohibition, and violating it
so long as they compensate anyone who is adversely affected as
a result. Thus, a court should attempt to provide plaintiffs, to
the greatest extent possible, with the specific rights and
interests that a statute protects.195 Whenever possible, a court
should aim to directly or specifically undo the effects of a past
statutory violation, rather than relegating the plaintiff to a
substitute monetary judgment. It is likely this instinct that led
many pre-eBay courts to either skip an irreparable injury
analysis when deciding whether to issue statutory injunctions,
or else conclude that violations of a statutory right constituted
irreparable injury as a matter of law. 196
The irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law
requirements are largely anachronisms. English Chancery
Courts required petitioners to demonstrate that they lacked an
adequate remedy at law to avoid interfering with Common
Pleas, which had jurisdiction over common-law claims. 197
Modern federal courts, in contrast, have jurisdiction over actions
in both law and equity. 198 The original justification for this
limitation on the exercise of equitable powers therefore no
longer applies.
195 Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 387 (cited in note 26) (" [C]ourts will devalue
plaintiff's rights by substituting for injunctive relief the prospect of compensation or
consolation."). See also 78 Harv L Rev at 1020 (cited in note 59) ("[I]t may be thought
improper or unfair to allow the defendant unjustifiably to inflict harm on the plaintiff,
leaving the latter with no alternative but to seek monetary compensation. . . . [N]o
presumption in favor of one form of relief is tenable."). Compare with Rendleman, 90
Mich L Rev at 1649 (cited in note 186). But see Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for
Enjoining Teacher Strikes: The Irreparable Harm Test and Its Statutory Analogues, 69
Iowa L Rev 853, 860-61 (1984) (arguing that a court's refusal to issue an injunction
based on the irreparable injury rule "does not necessarily signal judicial condonation" of
the illegal act).
196 See, for example, notes 67-68.
197 Frederic William Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures 3-5 (Cambridge 1936)
(A. H. Chaytor, W. J. Whittaker, and John Brunyate, eds); Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev
at 385 (cited in note 26). See also Leubsdorf, 91 Harv L Rev at 530 (cited in note 26).




The primary modern justification for the irreparable injury
and inadequate remedy at law requirements is to promote
judicial economy. According to this argument, plaintiffs should
presumptively receive damages because awarding them is easier
for courts than crafting and enforcing injunctions. 199 This
justification is an overgeneralization and appears to lack
empirical support. In many cases, it likely would be fairly easy
for a court to provide non-monetary remedial relief, and there is
no reason to believe that the difficulties associated with crafting
an appropriate injunction-particularly when litigants submit
proposed orders-are systematically greater than those present
in damages actions.
Damages claims can be burdensome because the parties
often must introduce additional evidence, beyond that relating
to liability, to establish the proper amount of damages. The
court often must resolve legal disputes concerning the propriety
of recovery for certain types of harm, and make difficult
subjective determinations, such as the proper valuation for a
plaintiff's emotional distress, pain and suffering, or loss of body
parts. Moreover, although courts must hold contempt
proceedings when defendants disobey injunctions, subsequent
judicial proceedings are similarly required when defendants
refuse to satisfy monetary judgments. Thus, particularly in the
absence of supporting empirical evidence, judicial economy is not
a facially persuasive reason for systematically favoring
monetary judgments over injunctions ordering non-monetary
relief.
Another main reason why courts limit the availability of
injunctions is because of their chilling effect on otherwise legal
conduct. 200 This concern primarily applies, however, to
prospective provisions that seek to govern a defendant's future
behavior. 201 A purely remedial provision, in contrast, would
require only the return of the interest or property of which the
plaintiff was wrongly deprived, if possible, without regard to the
defendant's future conduct.
199 Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 387-89, 395, 419 (cited in note 26); 78 Harv L Rev
at 1020 (cited in note 59); Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite
for an Injunction, 33 U Fla L Rev 346, 346 (1981).
200 Shreve, 51 Geo Wash L Rev at 387-89, 419 (cited in note 26).
201 See Section II.B.
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Finally, Rendleman has argued that the irreparable injury
rule protects the role of the jury by compelling plaintiffs to seek
legal remedies-which trigger the Seventh Amendment's right
to a jury trial202-whenever reasonably possible. 203 Considering
the dearth of jury trials that occur each year, 204 however, this
rationale is largely theoretical. Moreover, many commentators
have raised powerful concerns about juries that might warrant
limiting their availability, including doubts that lay jurors can
understand the law and accurately follow the judge's
instructions; 2 05 related questions about jurors' ability to
understand and evaluate complicated or technical evidence or
expert opinions; 206 apprehension about jurors' ability to draw
accurate conclusions based on their observations of witnesses'
speech, tone, and demeanor; 207 and fear of jurors' bias. 208
Even if it is necessary or advantageous to protect the jury's
role in civil cases, judges could use them to make liability
determinationS209 or render special verdicts, 210 or even rely on
them in an advisory capacity, 211 while still crafting remedial
orders themselves when there are no damages to calculate.
Thus, courts should abandon the irreparable injury and
inadequate remedy at law requirements for injunctive relief.
202 See US Const Amend VII.
203 Rendleman, 90 Mich L Rev at 1645 (cited in note 186).
204 John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
Yale L J 522, 524 (2012).
201 See, for example, Walter W. Steele Jr and Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury
Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 NC L Rev 77, 77-78 (1988).
206 See, for example, Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The Legality of
Expert Juries in Patent Litigation, 2 Colum Sci & Tech L Rev 1, 1-2 (2001); Joseph
Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial
Processes, 48 DePaul L Rev 355, 356-57 (1998).
207 See, for example, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips:
The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 Neb L Rev 1157,
1159-60 (1993).
208 See, for example, Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 Mich L Rev 63, 66 (1993).
209 Compare with Beacon Theaters, Inc u Westover, 359 US 500, 508 (1959)
("Whatever permanent injunctive relief [a plaintiff] might be entitled to on the basis of
the decision in this case could, of course, be given by the court after the jury renders its
verdict.").
210 See FRCP 49(a)(1).
211 See FRCP 39(c).
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2. Modifying the balance-of-hardships and public interest
factors for non-monetary relief.
Courts should apply modified versions of eBay's balance-of-
hardships and public interest factors when considering non-
monetary remedies for statutory violations. A court should order
such relief for a successful plaintiff, if possible, unless the
combined burden or harm it would cause for the defendant and
third partieS212 would overwhelmingly outweigh the benefit to
the plaintiff.
This proposed standard tilts the scale much more heavily in
favor of injunctive relief than the traditional eBay factors. A
defendant should not be able to avoid satisfying its statutory
obligations or providing the most effective relief for a statutory
violation, simply because the court concludes that the resulting
burdens would exceed the marginal benefit to the plaintiff. As
one commentator persuasively puts it,
The defendant in an injunction proceeding who asks the
court to balance the remedies in his favor is, in effect,
asking the court to approve of his decision not to comply
with the duties that law-abiding citizens comply with
voluntarily. Thus, the court is being asked to voice its
approval of lawless conduct. 213
By passing a statute, Congress already has made the policy
decision to impose certain burdens or reallocate resources and,
so long as that decision is constitutional, a court should not
second-guess it at the remedial stage of a lawsuit. Rather than
allowing or requiring courts to reassess congressional policy
decisions, 214 the new framework's proposed application of the
212 See Orin H. Lewis, Note, "The Wild Card That Is the Public Interest": Putting a
New Face on the Fourth Preliminary Injunction Factor, 72 Tex L Rev 849, 854 (1994)
(arguing that the "public interest" prong of the eBay test should allow courts to consider
the "particularized nonparty harm" that an injunction would cause); Laura W. Stein, The
Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests Should Count in Preliminary
Injunction Actions, 16 Rev Litig 27, 34, 37-39, 63 (1997) (arguing that, in considering the
'public interest" prong of the eBay test, the court should consider any harm to non-
parties, unless the underlying statute specifically precludes consideration of it).
213 Farber, 45 U Pitt L Rev at 535-36 (cited in note 123).
214 Schoenbrod, 72 Minn L Rev at 638 (cited in note 111) (cautioning that some
courts use equitable balancing to "countermand legislative priorities established in the
law of liability by ignoring the statutory rule based on their own policy choices"); Farber,
45 U Pitt L Rev at 542-43 (cited in note 123); Weinberger, 456 US at 335 (Stevens
dissenting).
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balance-of-hardships and public interest prongs recognizes
Congress's primacy in determining legal obligations, while
preventing the unwarranted imposition of massive hardship.
Some might object that courts should not be permitted to
selectively underenforce statutes, even in such rare cases,
because it is Congress's constitutional responsibility to amend
the law as necessary to avoid unintended or overly harsh
consequences. 2 15 Other commentators, approaching the issue
from a remedial equilibration perspective, 216 maintain that
courts should automatically issue injunctions to remedy
statutory violations, but take into account undue hardship, the
public interest, and other such equitable factors when
interpreting a statute at the liability stage, to determine
whether the challenged conduct violates it.217
This Article's proposed framework recognizes the need for a
"safety valve" to protect against the imprudent issuance of
potentially destructive injunctions. 218 It advocates that this
safety valve be very limited, however, and incorporated at the
remedies phase, rather than affect statutory interpretation at
the liability stage. Congress necessarily legislates at the
"wholesale" level, and cannot always foresee or address all
215 Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 527-28, 586 (cited in note 26); Farber, 45 U Pitt L Rev at
543 (cited in note 123). See also Weinberger, 456 US at 329-30 (Stevens dissenting).
216 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum L
Rev 857, 884 (1999) (arguing that a "right may be shaped by the nature of the remedy
that will follow if the right is violated"). Compare with Comment, 57 Yale L J at 1048
(cited in note 36) (arguing that, because injunctions are a milder alternative to
potentially ruinous financial liability or imprisonment, courts may be willing to construe
new laws providing for injunctive relief more broadly than they would if a different
remedy were required); John C. Jeffries Jr, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 Yale L J 87, 87-90 (1999) (arguing that courts are likely to construe
constitutional rights more broadly when an injunction, rather than damages, is the only
available remedy).
217 Fregeau, Comment, 18 BC Envir Affairs L Rev at 539 (cited in note 28). Fregeau
argues:
The Supreme Court should acknowledge equitable discretion to be nothing
more than a process of statutory interpretation. . . . The courts, via statutory
interpretation, would decide if Congress meant to prohibit the conduct in
question. If Congress did not prohibit the action, then no injunction would
issue. If, however, Congress meant to prohibit the conduct in question, then an
injunction would be required.
Id. He elaborates that courts may consider the likelihood of harm to the litigants and
third parties, the public interest, and "exigent or exculpatory situations" when
interpreting a statute. Id at 542.




possible "retail" applications of a statute and its
consequences. 2 19 Individuals who are adversely affected by a
statute, even if unintentionally, cannot count on legislators to
even consider their plight, much less undertake the substantial
burden of amending the law.2 2 0 Courts, in contrast, have at least
a theoretical obligation to consider and be responsive to the
arguments that the litigants before them assert. 221
Incorporating a limited degree of flexibility at the remedies
stage is more respectful of Congress's legislative role than
allowing equitable concerns to affect the court's interpretation of
a statute's substantive provisions. Moreover, faithful
interpretation and application of a statute at the liability stage
makes the exercise of (carefully circumscribed) discretion at the
remedies stage both descriptively more likely to occur and
normatively more defensible, 222 especially in light of courts'
traditional discretion over the issuance of injunctions. 223
Schoenbrod offers a similar recommendation, but would
permit a court to deny injunctive relief only under much
narrower circumstances. He contends that a court should grant
a statutory injunction to a successful plaintiff unless: "(a)
different relief is consistent with the goals of the statute and
(b) the case involves a factor justifying departure from the
statutory rule that was not reflected in its formulation." 2 2 4
Schoenbrod emphasizes, "To justify deviation from the statutory
rule, therefore, a defendant must demonstrate that the case
presents a factor that the legislature did not already take into
account when the rule was formulated."2 2 5 His approach is a
219 Compare with Lewis, 72 Tex L Rev at 876-77 (cited in note 212) (advocating that
courts weigh harm to third parties that "substantially deviate[s] from the harm normally
anticipated as a consequence of the enforcement of the substantive law").
220 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L
Rev 1441, 1444-47 (2008).
221 See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and
the Duty to Decide, 94 Georgetown L J 121, 125 (2005) ("[A]djudicative legitimacy
depends . . . on [udicial] decisions that squarely confront [litigants'] proofs and
arguments, even if the court determines that they do not ultimately supply an
appropriate basis for resolution.").
222 Levinson, 99 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 216).
223 See note 28.
224 Schoenbrod, 72 Minn L Rev at 647 (cited in note 111).
221 Id at 649. See also Stein, 16 Rev Litig at 32 (cited in note 212) (arguing that,
when deciding whether to issue an injunction, a court should consider any harm the
injunction would cause unless doing so would be "inconsistent with the purposes of the
underlying law").
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good start and faithful to the Court's rulings in Hill 2 2 6 and
Oakland Cannabis, 227 but tolerates a substantial amount of
potentially unwarranted hardship, for both defendants and third
parties, that equitable discretion is intended to alleviate.
Schoenbrod's approach also seems to be in greater tension
with eBay and cases applying it than this Article's
recommendations. For example, in Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc v W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc, 228 the district court-in a
ruling upheld by the Federal Circuit 229-refused to enjoin the
sale of medical devices that vascular surgeons required to
perform surgery, but infringed the plaintiff's patent. The court
explained:
[Considering] the important role that these products play
in aiding vascular surgeons who perform life saving
medical treatments, sound public policy does not favor
removing Gore's items from the market. The risk is too
great. Placing Gore's infringing products out of reach of
the surgeons who rely on them would only work to deny
many sick patients a full range of clinically effective and
potentially life saving treatments. The Court finds that
the strength of this factor alone precludes it from
imposing a permanent injunction. 230
Congress unavoidably knew that protecting patents would
limit access to other people's intellectual property and that, at
least in the modern era, medical technology and
pharmaceuticals comprise a substantial fraction of protected
materials. Thus, restrictions on the availability of patented
medical equipment cannot be deemed an unexpected or
226 437 US at 193.
227 532 US at 497.
228 2009 US Dist LEXIS 31328, *30 (D Ariz), affd 670 F3d 1171 (Fed Cir 2012), vacd
in part on other grounds, 476 F Appx 747 (Fed Cir 2012) (per curiam) (en bane), affd 682
F3d 1003 (Fed Cir 2012).
229 Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc v W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc, 670 F3d 1171 (Fed
Cir 2012), vacd in part on other grounds, 476 F Appx 747 (Fed Cir 2012) (per curiam) (en
bane), affd 682 F3d 1003 (Fed Cir 2012).
230 Bard Peripheral Vascular, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 31328 at *30. See also Psihoyos v
John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 115835, *14-15 (SDNY) ("[E]njoining the
defendant from selling its existing inventory of five-hundred page academic textbooks,
when each is alleged to contain no more than two to three photographs that may or may
not have been properly registered by the plaintiff, would impose a severe hardship on the
defendant and constitute an inappropriate use of the Court's equitable powers.").
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overlooked consequence of the intellectual property system.
Schoenbrod's proposed approach does not appear to permit
courts to refrain from ordering the destruction or return of
infringing materials under such circumstances.
This Article's proposal does, however, leave open the
possibility that a plaintiff who prevails under a statute that
authorizes only injunctive relief might be denied any meaningful
remedy at all. Scholars such as Rendleman contend that,
"[w]hen an injunction is the plaintiff's only meaningful remedy,"
declining to grant it "sacrifices the plaintiff's right[s]." 231 Such
an outcome stems from the underlying statute's remedial
limitations, however, rather than any abuse of discretion by the
court.
3. Monetary relief.
Courts should treat equitable claims for monetary relief as
suits for compensatory damages. The distinctions among
remedies such as damages, restitution, disgorgement, backpay,
and other ways of seeking money are further remnants of the
English judiciary's bifurcation between common-law courts and
Chancery. The wide range of arbitrary disparities that such
distinctions create has been well documented elsewhere. 232
Although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Symposium, this Article tentatively recommends that courts
treat all causes of action for monetary relief-whether they
historically would be considered legal or equitable-as damages
suits.
B. Prospective Provisions
Many commentators argue that courts generally should
grant prospective injunctions, prohibiting future violations of
the law, to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course. Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, for example, contends that "a court has no discretion
or authority to exercise equitable powers so as to permit
violations of statutes to continue," 233 even if the violation is
231 Rendleman, 27 Rev Litig at 86 (cited in note 109).
232 See, for example, Colleen P. Murphy, Money as a "Specific" Remedy, 58 Ala L Rev
119 (2006).
233 Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 525-26 (cited in note 26). See also Fregeau, Comment, 18
BC Envir Affairs L Rev at 541 (cited in note 28) ("If the statute is interpreted to prohibit
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technical, minor, or would result in great public benefit. 234 He
explains, "The moment that a district court judge sitting in
equity begins to consider whether a valid statute must be obeyed
... the judicial system departs from the careful boundaries that
have been maintained in this country over two centuries and
invades the core function of the legislature." 2 35
Under current law, this is a reasonable approach to prevent
courts from effectively amending or nullifying laws or otherwise
undermining the legislature's authority, with one caveat that
much of the literature tends to overlook. Prospective orders
should either prohibit violations of a particular statutory
provision, or instead bar certain threatened, recurring, or
ongoing conduct that the court has determined violates the
statute. Courts should avoid entering broad, prophylactic
injunctions that prohibit otherwise lawful activities. 236 An
injunction "that gives the plaintiff more than [her] rightful
position . . . takes away the defendant's right to engage in
perfectly legal conduct." 2 37
Determining that certain conduct should be prohibited is a
quintessentially legislative function, particularly in the federal
system, where federal courts generally lack the ability to make
common law.2 38 Moreover, statutes reflect a careful balance
among numerous interests. The precise scope of a statutory
prohibition often embodies tradeoffs, compromises, and
concessions necessary for the statute to traverse the legislative
process's numerous vetogates. 239 A court that unilaterally
imposes additional restrictions on defendants may potentially
undo a legislative "deal," leading to results that were not, and
could not have been, enacted through the legislative process
itself. And when courts impose additional "prophylactic"
the actions in question, then an injunction must issue."); Farber, 45 U Pitt L Rev at 538
(cited in note 123) (arguing that, if a statute imposes an "absolute duty" of compliance,
courts should issue injunctions as a matter of course to enforce it).
234 Plater, 70 Cal L Rev at 526-27 (cited in note 26).
235 Id at 592 (cited in note 26). See also Axline, 12 Harv Envir L Rev at 44 (cited in
note 125).
236 Schoenbrod, 72 Minn L Rev at 647-48 (cited in note 111). But see Tracy A.
Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of
Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 Buff L Rev 301, 314-18 (2004).
237 Schoenbrod, 72 Minn L Rev at 629 (cited in note 111).
238 See Erie Railroad Co u Tompkins, 304 US 64, 78 (1938).
239 See Eskridge, 83 Notre Dame L Rev at 1444-47 (cited in note 220); John F.
Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va L Rev 419, 440-42 (2005).
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restrictions, they generally cannot even claim to be applying the
type of expertise and careful empirical study upon which
administrative agencies purportedly rely when promulgating
regulations. 240 Additionally, it is contrary to rule-of-law values
to allow a court to effectively create a new law that is
enforceable only against a particular defendant or defendants.
Thus, while, under current law, courts should issue prospective
injunctions against statutory violations, they should not include
purely prophylactic provisions in such orders.
Once a court issues an injunction, it has broad discretion to
decide whether, through civil or criminal contempt remedies, to
enforce it. It is preferable for judicial discretion to enter into the
equation at the contempt stage, rather than the injunction
stage. Whereas declining to issue a statutory injunction puts a
court in the uncomfortable position of failing to enforce a federal
law, in direct tension with Congress, the court necessarily has
far greater discretion over the enforcement of its own orders.
The separation of powers and policymaking concerns of declining
to enforce a court order-or declining to do so immediately, or
with full force-are far less than those raised by failing to
provide a remedy for a statutory violation. Thus, enjoining
statutory violations has the generally overlooked virtue of
elegantly transitioning the dispute from one arising under
federal law to one arising under a court order, thereby greatly
expanding the permissible scope of enforcement discretion a
court might employ.
This discussion reveals the problems with relying on
injunctions as prospective remedies for statutory violations. As
mentioned earlier, the use of injunctions as statutory remedies
is something of an anachronism. The injunction originated as a
remedy available in Chancery when a claimant lacked an
adequate remedy at law. A petition could invoke equity to
enforce moral rights and obligations that the ossified common
law, mired in the writ system, would not evolve to recognize. 241
Transplanting the injunction from these equitable origins to use
as a prospective statutory remedy makes little sense; as
240 See City of Arlington u FCC, 133 S Ct 1863, 1876 (2013).
241 See John H. Langbein, et al, History of the Common Law: The Development of
Anglo American Legal Institutions 272 (Aspen 2009). See also, Thomas 0. Main,
Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 Wash L Rev 429, 442-44 (2003).
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discussed in greater detail below, Congress should cease
authorizing such relief.
A prospective statutory injunction may serve four purposes:
(i) prohibiting a defendant from violating a statute, (ii) clarifying
that certain conduct violates a statute, (iii) proscribing
additional conduct that does not violate a statute, and
(iv) enhancing the consequences of statutory violations. None of
these functions provides a sufficient rationale for Congress to
continue authorizing courts to issue prospective injunctions
against statutory violations (as opposed to remedial injunctions,
discussed earlier 2 4 2).
First, and most basically, an injunction is not necessary to
prohibit a defendant from violating a statute, because the
statute itself already forbids the conduct at issue and
establishes the parties' respective legal rights and obligations. A
court order simply directing compliance with a certain statute or
regulation undermines the importance or primacy of the
underlying legal provision itself.
Second, a prospective statutory injunction is not required to
play a law-clarifying role. One might argue that an injunction
offers the advantage of allowing a court to prohibit a defendant
from engaging in certain specific conduct that the court has
concluded would violate the underlying statute. A court can
specify that certain conduct violates a statute in other ways,
however, such as through judicial opinions and declaratory
judgments. Furthermore, once a statute such as the Civil Rights
Act has been the subject of a substantial amount of litigation,
there will be no need for such clarification in whole categories of
cases. Thus, an injunction is unnecessary to clarify that certain
conduct violates a statute.
Third, a court may include prophylactic provisions in an
injunction to bar certain conduct that does not violate the
statute itself. As discussed earlier, courts should avoid issuing
these types of injunctions, and Congress should not authorize
them.
Finally, the most significant effect of an injunction is to
change the remedy for statutory violations, by subjecting the
defendant to the possibility of civil and criminal contempt. 2 4 3 A
242 See Subsection III.A2.
243 See Morley, 35 Cardozo L Rev at 2463 (cited in note 20) (explaining remedies for
violations of court orders in greater detail).
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defendant who violates a statute that provides for injunctive
relief, by definition, faces the possibility of being subject to an
injunction. It has been argued that this gives the defendant a
"relatively free bite of forbidden fruit."2 4 4 Instead of requiring
courts to issue injunctions as an "intermediate" step, Congress
instead should permit courts to enforce statutes directly through
civil contempt-type proceedings (although potentially with a
different name, to reflect this new context).245 Allowing courts to
grant such relief directly for statutory violations would bolster
the deterrent effect of federal laws and the speed with which
they may be enforced. It also would promote judicial economy,
allowing courts to skip a largely unnecessary step and
alleviating the need for disputes over whether injunctions
should issue and how they should be crafted. 246
IV. CONCLUSION
Statutes such as the Civil Rights Act that rely heavily on
injunctions as remedies raise critical questions about the scope
of courts' power to decline to provide relief for past violations of
the law or allow future violations to continue unabated. Some of
these difficulties arise from doctrines that have been carried
244 Comment, 57 Yale L J at 1044 (cited in note 36). See, for example, Stuart R.
Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 Tex L Rev 591, 636 (1983).
241 Congress also could consider allowing courts to directly enforce certain statutes
through criminal contempt-type proceedings, without the need to first issue an
antecedent injunction. Such proceedings would be conducted in accordance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, including the right to a jury, where applicable. See
US Const Amend Vl; 18 USC § 3691; Taylor v Hayes, 418 US 488, 495-96 (1974).
Of course, it would be much more direct for Congress to simply establish violations of
those statutes as criminal offenses. The primary advantage of Congress providing for a
criminal contempt-type remedy, rather than simply enacting a criminal statute, is that a
court would be able to appoint a prosecutor to pursue a contempt-type charge if the
Government is unwilling or unable to do so. See FRCrP 42(a)(2). The judiciary generally
lacks similar authority to compel enforcement of criminal laws. While it may be
appropriate for courts to exercise such authority to enforce their own orders, however,
Young v United States, 481 US 787, 795-96 (1987), allowing them to do so to directly
enforce a statute would raise serious questions under the Take Care Clause, US Const
Art II, § 3, cl 5. See United States u Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 US 858, 863 (1982). Thus,
particularly as a first step, providing for the immediate imposition only of civil-contempt
type remedies for statutory violations is a preferable course of action.
246 A statute making civil contempt-type remedies immediately available against
federal, state, and local government agencies and officials who violate the Constitution
or federal statutes also might reduce or eliminate the need for injunctions in public law
cases. Compare with Morley, 35 Cardozo L Rev at 2465-87 (cited in note 20) (explaining
the importance of injunctive relief in public law cases).
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over from the English Chancery courts and no longer serve a
useful purpose. Whereas most earlier commentators have
argued that courts should apply either a single, universal
standard to determine whether to issue statutory injunctions, or
instead use different standards based on the type of statute at
issue, this Article contends that the applicable standard instead
should depend on the nature of the requested relief.
Non-monetary remedies for statutory violations generally
should be available unless the harm they would cause to the
defendant or third parties would substantially outweigh the
benefit to the plaintiff. Injunctions against future statutory
violations, in contrast, should issue as a matter of course,
though Congress should strongly consider amending federal
laws to alleviate the need for such relief, and instead make
contempt-type remedies immediately available to deter
violations. These proposals would help promote judicial economy
by eliminating the often unnecessary "intermediate" step of
issuing an injunction; abolish anachronistic doctrines, such as
the irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law
requirements, that can lead to arbitrary or unfair results;
protect separation of powers, by limiting the opportunity and
need for courts to make quintessentially policy-based judgments
concerning federal laws, and facilitate just outcomes.
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